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INTRODUCTION
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,i the U.S. Supreme Court held that
appellate courts must apply the abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing lower court decisions to admit or exclude expert opin-
ions under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Under the
abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court does not deter-
mine whether a particular trial court ruling was correct. Rather,
the appellate court only decides whether the trial court's ruling was
unreasonable or otherwise abusive3 As a result, federal appellate
courts generally do not have the power to rule categorically that
any scientific evidence should or should not be admitted, except
when admission or exclusion of such evidence would always be an
abuse of discretion. Instead, scientific evidence may be admissible
in one trial, while that same evidence might not be admissible in a
similar, but different case.
Later last Term, in United States v. Scheffer,4 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of Military Rule of Evidence 707,
which categorically forbids polygraph evidence in court-martial
proceedings.5 The Scheffer Court affirmed the rule-making author-
118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
2 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993);Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at
519; Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (stating that for standard of review
purposes, "decisions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories, denominated
questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for clear error), and
matters of discretion (reviewable for 'abuse of discretion')"); see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New
"Sliding Scale of Deference" Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of Distnct Court Depar-
tures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1997) (stating that
lower courts often use categorical approach in deciding what standard of review to use).
Lee noted that
[w]hile the Supreme Court has not created a comprehensive test for de-
ciding what standard of review governs any given issue, lower courts often
utilize a categorical approach under which questions of fact are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard, questions of law are reviewed under a
de novo standard, mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed under ei-
ther a clearly erroneous or de novo standard depending upon the nature
of the issue, and questions of trial court discretion are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
3 See Western Elec. Co., Inc. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 430-31 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(stating that abuse of discretion standard requires review of trial court's decision to deter-
mine whether it is clearly unreasonable).
4 118S. Ct. 1261 (1998).
5 See MILITARY R. EVID. 707(a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results
of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an
offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted
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ity's power to create broad, uniform evidentiary rules governing
the admissibility of scientific evidence.
This broad power stands in sharp contrast to the limited power
of federal appellate courts. Restricted to abuse of discretion re-
view, federal appellate courts cannot similarly create such uniform
evidentiary rules. Indeed, the Scheffer decision regarding lie detec-
tors illustrates this point. In Scheffer, the Court indicated that both
a decision to admit and to exclude polygraph evidence is reason-
able and, therefore, not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, fed-
eral appellate courts can no longer issue categorical rules regard-
ing the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
The result of Joiner for polygraphs, as well as other types of scien-
tific evidence, is that the same issue will be treated differently in
different trials. Like cases will not be treated alike. The law will be
less uniform and less predictable, causing an increase in the
amount and complexity of litigation.
This seemingly undesirable result must be tolerated if the abuse
of discretion review standard which produces it is truly the best
standard for scientific evidence. Joiner, however, did not make such
a policy choice. Rather, the Supreme Court simply concluded that
previous judicial rulings compelled it to adopt abuse of discretion
review.6 This standard, however, is not immutable. Just as the rule-
making authority can promulgate a categorical rule about the ad-
missibility of one form of scientific evidence, that authority can also
change the standard of review for scientific evidence as a whole.
This Article examines whether the present standard of review for
scientific evidence should change. Part I begins by examining
Joiner's adoption of abuse of discretion review for scientific evi-
dence. Part II discusses the implications of reading Joiner together
with Scheffer. Specifically, this Part illustrates how the abuse stan-
dard means that conflicting trial court decisions about particular
forms of scientific evidence must be tolerated until the rule-making
authority makes a categorical rule. Part III examines the reasons
that generally support the abuse standard and demonstrates that
many of these reasons do not support abuse of discretion review
for scientific evidence. This Part goes on to suggest that more in-
formation is needed before the rule-making authority can make an
informed policy choice. This Article concludes that the rule-
into evidence.").
6 See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517.
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making authority should collect the necessary information and
consider changing the standard of review. With a less deferential
standard, the law of scientific evidence can develop in a more uni-
form, predictable, and just manner.
I. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. V. JOINER AND ABUSE OF DISCRETION
REVIEW FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Precedent produced Joiner. Relying on modem and earlier judi-
cial decisions, the Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
first stated that "that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of
review of a district court's evidentiary rulings." The admissibility
7 Id. Joiner noted,
Indeed, our cases on the subject go back as far as Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99
U.S. 645, 658 (1878), where we said that "cases arise where it is very much
a matter of discretion with the court whether to receive or exclude the
evidence; but the appellate court will not reverse in such a case, unless the
ruling is manifestly erroneous."
Id. Edgar had won damages for personal injuries resulting from an attack in October by a
buck deer kept on defendant's property. The defendant had sought reversal because of
testimony from experts opining that male deer are especially dangerous in the fall during
their rutting season. The Court noted that experts are excepted from the general rule that
prohibits witness from giving opinions. The Court then stated, "It must appear, of course,
that the witness is qualified to speak to the point of inquiry.... Whether a witness is shown
to be qualified or not as an expert is a preliminary question to be determined in the first
place by the [trial] court... " Spring Co. 99 U.S. at 657-58. The Court then went on to state
that this determination was one for the discretion of the trial court which could be reversed
only if manifestly erroneous.
Joiner also cited the more modern cases of Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644
(1997), and United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984). In Old Chief interpreting Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, the Court stated, "The standard of review applicable to the evidentiary
rulings of the district court is abuse of discretion." Old Chief 117 S. CL at 647 n.l. In Abel,
which reviewed trial rulings about bias evidence, the Court stated, "A district court is ac-
corded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal
Rules.... We hold there was no abuse of discretion...." Abel, 469 U.S. at 54-55.
These are not the only times that the Supreme Court has applied the abuse of discre-
tion standard to evidentiary decisions. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,
172 (1988) ("The District Court's refusal to admit the proffered completion evidence was a
clear abuse of discretion."); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974) ("The District
Court retains considerable latitude even with admittedly relevant evidence in rejecting that
which is cumulative.... [T]he District Court's discretion was not abused.").
The Supreme Court, however, has not found every evidence decision to be a matter
for trial court discretion. Sometimes the issue has been categorized as legal and subject to
stricter review than for abuse of discretion. See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Deci-
sion Making Authority Between Trial and Appellate Levels: A Un/ied Kew of the Scope of Review, the
Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993, 1042 n.361 (1986) ("Ques-
tions classified as legal include the following: Whether evidence is protected by the work
product and attorney-client privileges, Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) [and]
... whether evidence is hearsay or qualifies under an exception to the hearsay rules, Mutual
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of scientific evidence is a trial court evidentiary ruling. Therefore,
the admissibility of scientific evidence should be reviewed only for
an abuse of discretion: "We hold... that abuse of discretion is the
proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to
admit or exclude scientific evidence."'
fe Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892)....").8 Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 519. Joiner had contracted small cell lung cancer. He sued daim-
ing that polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") produced by the defendants had caused that
cancer. The trial court ruled that Joiner's experts' opinions that PCBs had promoted the
lung cancer were not admissible under Daubert. '[T]he court finds that Plaintiffs have failed
to show by a preponderance of proof that their experts' opinions regarding the PCB/lung
cancer link are admissible under the standards set out in [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 702
and explicated in Daubert." Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1327 (N.D. Ga.
1994). As a result, defendants won their summary judgment motion.
The Eleventh Circuit conceded that the abuse of discretion standard applied, but
then seemed to indicate that when scientific evidence is excluded, a particularly strict form
of that standard is required. "A district court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.... Because the Federal Rules of Evidence governing ex-
pert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly stringent stan-
dard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony." Joiner v. General Elec.
Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (1lth Cir. 1996). The court then reversed, "Our review of the record
indicates... that there appears to be a genuine factual dispute as to whether PCBs alone
can cause cancer, and that this issue was inappropriate for summaryjudgment." Id. at 533.
The Supreme Court specifically rejected any notion that the review standard varied
depending on whether scientific evidence was excluded. "A court of appeals applying 'abuse
of discretion' review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allow-
ing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it." Joiner, 118 S. CL at 517. The situation
does not change because the trial court's determination to exclude scientific evidence leads
to a summary judgment against the proponent of the evidence. "On a motion for summary
judgment, disputed issues of fact are resolved against the moving party. .... But the question
of admissibility of expert testimony is not such an issue of fact, and is reviewable under the
abuse of discretion standard." Id.
The Supreme Court also rejected the contention that Daubert had changed this situa-
tion:
The Court of Appeals suggested that Daubert somehow altered this general
rule [requiring the abuse of discretion standard for evidence rulings] in
the context of a district court's decision to exclude scientific evidence.
But Daubert did not address the standard of appellate review for eviden-
tiary rulings at all.... [W]hile the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district
courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than
would have been admissible [before], they leave in place the "gatekeeper"
role of the trial judge in screening such evidence.
Id.
Most appellate courts before Joiner had applied an abuse of discretion or manifestly
erroneous standard of review to trial court determinations whether scientific evidence was
admissible pursuant to Daubert. See G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its
Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 1028 (1996) ("Though the
words vary, the meaning is the same: almost all of the cases say the standard [of review] is
broad or deferential, it is a clearly erroneous standard, it looks for a manifest or clear abuse
of discretion."); Richard M. Bernstein, 'Daubert' Revisited: The Proper Standard of Review, 25
PRODUCT & SAFETY LIABILITY REP. 500, 502 (1997) (First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
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While the Supreme Court has never truly defined what "abuse of
discretion" means,9 some conclusions are evident. The abuse of
discretion standard indicates that trial courts have discretion con-
cerning the admission of scientific evidence. Discretion impliesl 0
choice. As Professor Maurice Rosenberg explained, "To say that a
court has discretion in a given area of law is to say that it is not
bound to decide the question one way rather than another."" Ac-
cordingly, abuse of discretion requires appellate courts to allow
different trial courts to reach different conclusions regarding the
admissibility of a particular type of scientific evidence.12
Joiner seems to contemplate that courts will apply the abuse stan-
dard for scientific evidence the same way they do for evidence law
generally."i If so, appellate courts will be highly deferential to trial
court rulings about scientific evidence. Appellate courts have sel-
dom found trial court evidentiary rulings to be in error,'4 and pre-
Circuits used manifestly erroneous standard; the Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and District of
Columbia Circuits used an abuse of discretion standard; the Ninth Circuit employed both
formulations.).
In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), cited by the
Eleventh Circuit in Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529, was the most important decision employing a dif-
ferent standard. Pao/istated:
Although the review of the district court's fact findings that undergird its
rulings on the admissibility of expert opinion is deferential, given the
enormous power of the district court to foreclose submission of a party's
case to the jury on the basis of a threshold determination of nonreliability
of opinion evidence, we conclude that the review requires a "hard look" to
insure that the district court's exercise of discretion was sound and that it
correctly applied the several Daubert factors.
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 733.
9 See Lee, supra note 2, at 21. Lee noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has never provided
a clear definition of abuse of discretion review. At times, the Court seems to equate abuse of
discretion with the highly deferential clearly erroneous review. At other times, the Court has
hinted at a less deferential definition of abuse of discretion." (footnotes omitted).1" See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 636 (1971) (maintaining that "discretion conveys ...the idea of
choice").
1 Id. at 636-37.
2 See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, Official U.S. Supreme Court Transcript, No. 96-188,
1997 WL 634566, at *6 (Oct. 14, 1997), where ChiefJustice Rehnquist received an affirma-
tive answer to his question: "When... you say abuse of discretion, as opposed to perhaps de
novo review, .. . I take it that means that a ... properly acting district court might have
reached different ... conclusions on the same evidence, and both would be affirmed on
appeal?"
13 SeeJoiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517.
See Margaret A. Berger, When, if Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error,
25 Loy. LA L. REv. 893, 894-95 (1992). Although the federal courts were then trying about
20,000 cases a year, Berger only found thirty 1990 Court of Appeals decisions that stated in
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sumably now appellate courts will seldom overrule trial rulings on
the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Appellate courts, thus, have a limited role in deciding whether to
admit or exclude scientific evidence. They can formulate the
framework that trial judges must use to determine whether scien-
tific evidence is admissible. 5 That is what the Daubert Court did
when it held that scientific evidence must "fit" the particular case
and be the product of the scientific method to be admissible.
6
officially reported opinions that the court was reversing because of evidentiary error, and
she concluded that some of these reversals may really have been for reasons other than
evidentiary error. See id. Professor Berger concluded that this survey "leaves the impression
that evidentiary rules frequently matter relatively little in the case before the federal appel-
late court...." Id. at 907.
Similarly, Eleanor Swift reviewed all the reported federal decisions concerning se-
lected hearsay exceptions over several time periods and concluded:
[Wihether federal district courts admit or exclude the hearsay, appellate
courts usually uphold the district courts' decision on appeal.... [T]wenty-
six percent of the district courts' decisions were found erroneous but in
only thirteen percent of the cases did the errors cause reversal .... [T]he
impression is unmistakable that many federal appellate courts do not
think it is their role to review district court admission and exclusion deci-
sions carefully. The deferential "abuse of discretion" standard of review
produces a low rate of trial court error.
Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Wo*. Has It Been Abolished De Facto by judicial Decision?, 76
MINN. L. REv. 473, 478-79 (1992) (citations omitted). David Leonard reviewed decisions of
another portion of the evidence rules and reached a similar condusion:
Appellate courts appear to conduct appallingly superficial review of trial
courts' application of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 608(b) .... [O]nce the
appellate courts find that the evidence was offered pursuant to the "discre-
tionary" part of rule 608(b), their analysis ceases. It is as though the trial
court's action is simply not subject to review once the appellate court de-
termines that the trial court applied the correct rule.
David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1155, 1220,
1227 (1992); see also Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of Evidence Matter?, 25 LOY. LA L.
REv. 909, 921 (1992) (noting that "where the language of the rule permits, appellate courts
are inclined to justify the trial judge's decision on the grounds of discretion").
is See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA
L. REv. 413, 427 (1989) (stating that "[u]niformly.. . the [trial] court's discretion [under
the Federal Rules of Evidence] is guided"); see alsoJon R. Waltz, judicial Discretion in the Ad-
mission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1097, 1103 (1984)
(noting that "[g]uided discretion ... identifies areas in which a judge has some flexibility
and choice in decisionmaking but is restrained by more or less specific standards or guide-
lines to which he visibly must adhere").
16 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993). The Daubert
Court held that scientific evidence must "fit" the particular case in which it is proffered. See
id. at 591. "[Federal Rule of Evidence] 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." Id. at 591-92. Fur-
thermore, the proffered evidence must be the product of a scientific method:
Univemity of Califormia Davis [Vol. 32:289
With that framework established, however, the appellate court's
only job is to insure that the trial court has properly used the pre-
scribed guidelines to reach its result. 7
If that framework is employed, the appellate court must affirm
the trial court's decision except in the rare instance when the trial
court abuses its discretion in applying the guidelines. The appel-
late court, then, does not decide whether the scientific evidence
should have been admitted. It does not reverse simply because it
would have decided the issue differently from the trial court.8 It
does not dictate how trial courts should decide future admissibility
questions about similar kinds of evidence. Instead, the appellate
The subject of an expert's testimony must be "scientific . . . knowledge."
The adjective "scientific" implies a grounding in the methods and proce-
dures of science. Similarly, the word "knowledge" connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation. . . . [I]n order to qualify as
"scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion must be derived by the
scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation - i.e., "good grounds," based on what is known. In short, the
requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge"
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.
Id. at 589-90. To make this determination, a trial court must undertake a "flexible" inquiry
into whether the proffer is of truly "scientific knowledge." See id. at 594. Many factors can
influence the inquiry, but the trial court should consider whether the theory or technique
.can be (and has been) tested [and] whether [it] has been subjected to peer review and
publication." Id. at 593. The trial court should also consider "the known or potential rate of
error.., and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's op-
eration" as well as the acceptance of the theory or technique in the relevant scientific com-
munity. Id. at 594.
Cf United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334-35 (1988) (concluding that trial courts
have "guided discretion" when determining whether to dismiss cases under Speedy Trial Act,
18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 et seq., because statute gives factors to be considered in making dismissal
decisions). The Court continued: "[A] district court must carefully consider those factors as
applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in
order to permit meaningful appellate review." Id. at 336-37. The Court held: "The District
Court failed to consider all the factors relevant to the choice of a remedy under the Act.
What factors it did rely on were unsupported by factual findings or evidence in the record.
We conclude that the District Court abused its discretion under the Act...." Il at 344; see
also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (stating that appellate courts must use
abuse of discretion standard in reviewing trial court departures from United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, but also noting that "an abuse of discretion standard does not mean a mis-
take of law is beyond appellate correction.... A district court by definition abuses its discre-
tion when it makes an error of law.") (citations omitted).is Cf Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (noting that clearly
erroneous review "standard ... does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of
the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differ-
ently"). Elsewhere, the Court has seemed to equate the clearly erroneous and abuse of
discretion standards. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 n.3 (1996); see a/so
Leonard, supra note 14, at 1189 n.187 (stating that clearly erroneous standard is equivalent
to abuse of discretion standard).
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court simply determines whether the trial court's choice was rea-
sonable or permissible."
When reasonable people could differ over whether the proffered
scientific evidence satisfies the Daubert standard for admissibility,
the appellate court must affirm a decision either to admit or ex-
clude such evidence. When reasonable minds can differ, appellate
courts cannot create a categorical rule about the admissibility of
any particular scientific evidence no matter how wise it may be to
have such uniformity.2 Consequently, trial courts sitting in the
same jurisdiction can reach opposite conclusions about the admis-
sibility of a particular type of scientific evidence, and the appellate
court must affirm those contrary results.
The rule-making authority, however, is not so limited. As Scheffer
indicates, even when reasonable minds differ about the admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence, and federal appellate courts cannot create
a categorical rule, the rule-making authority can.
II. THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY'S POWER
Edward Scheffer's proffer of the results of a polygraph examina-
tion in his drug-offense court-martial was precluded by Military
Rule of Evidence 707, which makes polygraph evidence inadmissi-
ble in court-martials.2 ' The Supreme Court held that this provision
did not abridge Scheffer's constitutional right to present a defense.
The Court noted that an accused's right to present evidence is
subject to reasonable restrictions. Evidentiary "rulemakers have
19 Cf Louis, supra note 7, at 999. Louis states:
On appeal [of an issue for trigl court discretion], the question is not
whether the trial level result is the better or best one but only whether it is
a legally permissible one. Review, therefore, is limited to whether the ap-
plicable legal principles were identified and applied correctly and whether
the findings of ultimate fact exceed the limits of reasonableness.
Id.
20 Cf David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scienific Evidence Under Daubert andJoiner,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 978 (1997) (positing that "if scientific-factual disputes are removed
from appellate scrutiny, contradictory results are sure to follow, but with no mechanism to
cure them").
21 See United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1263 (1998). Scheffer was administered
a polygraph test shortly after giving a required urine sample to the Air Force, but before the
urinalysis results were known. See id. The polygraph test "indicated no deception" when he
denied using drugs. See id, When his urine sample tested positive, Scheffer sought to intro-
duce those polygraph results to bolster his claim that he had not knowingly used drugs. See
id.
-19991
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broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding
evidence from trials. Such rules do not abridge an accused's right
to present a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or 'dispro-
portionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. ' "2 Military
Rule of Evidence 707 satisfies these requirements. The rule serves
legitimate interests by "ensuring that only reliable evidence is in-
troduced at trial, preserving the jury's role in determining credibil-
ity, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the primary purpose
of the trial."3
The Court, however, also concluded that rational decision mak-
ers could disagree as to whether an absolute ban on polygraph evi-
dence actually promotes reliable trials. The Court found that sci-
entists and courts were "extremely polarized about the reliability of
polygraph techniques.... This lack of scientific consensus is re-
flected in the disagreement among state and federal courts con-
cerning both the admissibility and the reliability of polygraph evi-
dence."2 4 With opinions so divided, the rule-making authority can
constitutionally create a rule categorically barring all polygraph
evidence in criminal trials although a decision to admit such proof
would not be unreasonable.
The approach taken by the President in adopting Rule 707 - ex-
cluding polygraph evidence in all military trials - is a rational
and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in
barring unreliable evidence.... Individual jurisdictions... may
reasonably reach differing conclusions as to whether polygraph
evidence should be admitted. We cannot say, then, that pre-
sented with such widespread uncertainty, the President acted ar-
bitrarily or disproportionately in promulgating a per se rule ex-
cluding all polygraph evidence.25 ,i
Id. at 1264 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)).
" Id. at 1264-65.
2 Id. at 1265.
25 Id. at 1266; see also 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (1994). The Uniform Code of Military Justice
authorizes the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, to promulgate evi-
dentiary rules for the military courts:
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures including modes of proof,... may be
prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers
practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.
Id.; Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1270. Justice Stevens, dissenting, suggested that the lower courts,
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In essence, Scheffer held that the rule-making authority had not
abused its discretion in adopting this rule about scientific evidence.
The rule-making authority had the discretionary power to formu-
late rules of exclusion in order to promote the reliability of evi-
dence introduced at trial.& Because rational decisionmakers could
differ over whether polygraph tests are reliable, it was not an abuse
of discretion for the rule maker to adopt an absolute prohibition
on lie detector evidence. 7
before deciding whether Rule 707 violated the Constitution, should have first required "the
parties to brief and argue the antecedent question whether Rule 707 violates Article 36(a) of
the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice.... As presently advised, I am persuaded that the Rule
does violate the statute and should be held invalid for that reason." Id. (StevensJ., dissent-
ing).
As the Scheffer Court noted, citing Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 802, and 901: "State
and federal governments unquestionably have a legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable
evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial. Indeed, the exclusion of unreli-
able evidence is a principal objective of many evidentiary rules." Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1265.
2 See id. The Court also held that Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1988), Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), do not support
the constitutional right to present polygraph evidence. These three cases found constitu-
tional violations because evidence was excluded. Those exclusions, however, "significantly
undermined fundamental elements of the accused's defense" by preventing the accused
from relating her version of events or by preventing fact witnesses from testifying. See Schef-
fer, 118 S. Ct. at 1267-68. On the other hand,
Rule 707 does not implicate any significant interest of the accused. Here,
the court members heard all of the relevant details of the charged offense
from the perspective of the accused, and the Rule did not preclude him
from introducing any factual evidence. Rather, respondent was barred
merely from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own
credibility.
Id. at 1268-69 (footnotes omitted). In other portions of his opinion, in which only three
other justices concurred, Justice Thomas also concluded that Rule 707 promotes the legiti-
mate goal "of avoiding litigation over issues other than the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused." Id. at 1267. This plurality further concluded that Rule 707 also serves the interest of
"[p]reserving the jury's core function of making credibility determinations in criminal trials.
... [J]urisdictions may legitimately determine that the aura of infallibility attending poly-
graph evidence can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility." Id at 1266-67.
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Ginsburg, and
Justice Breyer, concurred in the holding that Rule 707 did not violate the Constitution. See
id. at 1269. Kennedy, however, disagreed with the conclusions about the jury's competence:
The continuing, good-faith disagreement among experts and courts on the
subject of polygraph reliability counsels against our invalidating a per se
exclusion of polygraph results.... With all respect .... it seems the prin-
cipal opinion overreaches when it rests its holding on the additional
ground that the jury's role in making credibility determinations is dimin-
ished when it hears polygraph evidence. I am in substantial agreement
with Justice Stevens' observation that the argument demeans and mistakes
the role and competence ofjurors in deciding the factual question of guilt
or innocence.
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Certainly, if the rule-making authority can make categorical rules
for a particular form of scientific evidence in criminal cases, that
authority, which is ultimately Congress for the federal courts, can
promulgate categorical rules for scientific evidence in all trials.
When reasonable people can differ over whether a particular type
of scientific evidence is reliable, Congress, but not appellate courts,
can make policy choices and prescribe a rule of evidence.2
On one level, Joiner and Scheffer read together should cast doubt
on how polygraph evidence is treated in some federal courts. Schef
fer noted that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits decided to leave the ad-
missibility of lie detectors to the discretion of the trial courts,2m the
Fourth Circuit had recently reaffirmed its per se ban on polygraph
evidence,30 and the Second Circuit had "recently noted that it has
'not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of
reliability to be admissible. ' "31 Scheffer listed the Fourth Circuit's
Id.
21 See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). In Usery, a provision of
the Coal Mining Health and Safety Act of 1969 prohibited a denial of benefits for pneumo-
coniosis based solely on X-ray evidence. The Court concluded that this provision was consti-
tutional: "It is sufficient that the evidence before Congress showed doubts about the reliabil-
ity of negative X-ray evidence. That Congress ultimately determined 'to resolve doubts in
favor of the disabled miner' does not render the enactment arbitrary under the standard of
rationality appropriate to this legislation." Id. at 34; cf. RonaldJ. Allen, Montana v. Egelhoff
- Reflections on the Limits of Legislative Imagination and Judicial Authority, 87 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 633, 652-53 (1997):
In our jurisprudence, the legislative power extends to the creation of
rules of general applicability, the judicial to the decision in particular
cases. If a legislature can specify the implications of particular pieces of
evidence, this pragmatic distinction between legislatures and courts is con-
siderably reduced, perhaps even eliminated....
* * , Today, it is simply accepted that legislatures may prescribe rules of
evidence for the courts . . . The Court has even approved the legislative
prescribing of the effect of particular kinds of evidence. Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co. dealt with, among other things, a federal statute for-
bidding the denial of black lung benefits solely [on] the basis of an x-ray.
Without any apparent recognition of the depth of the problem, the Court
found this acceptable, commenting that of course Congress has plenary
authority over rules of evidence.
See Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1266 (citing United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th
Cir. 1995) and United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also United
States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 205 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that polygraph admissibility is in
trial court's discretion).
30 See United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997); see also United States
v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 1987) (concluding per se ban on polygraph
evidence).
1 United States v. Messina, 131 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1997), quoted in Scheffer, 118 S. CL at
1266; cf United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding per se ban on
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per se prohibition without comment, even though the Supreme
Court had decided Joiner a few months earlier. Scheffe, however,
indicates that both a decision to admit or exclude lie detector evi-
dence is reasonable. 32  Because neither a decision to admit nor a
decision to exclude such evidence would be an abuse of discretion,
federal appellate courts are required to affirm both decisions.
Consequently, federal appellate courts such as the Fourth Circuit
can no longer enforce a per se prohibition on polygraphs.35
It is ironic, then, that Scheffer upholds a polygraph ban in military
courts, for Scheffer and Joiner actually serve to open the door wider
for polygraph evidence by lifting the previous per se ban in the
federal courts. One federal trial court may now hear information
about the reliability of polygraphs and exclude the evidence with a
conviction resulting. Next door, perhaps, another judge may hear
the same data about reliability and admit the evidence with an ac-
quittal following. Furthermore, each time such evidence is prof-
fered, the litigants and the court will have to spend the time and
resources exploring the reliability of that scientific evidence. Even
if such disparate, time-consuming treatment of the same evidence
seems unjust or unwise, the appellate courts are powerless to im-
polygraph evidence).
The Supreme Court could also have added that the Sixth, Eight, and Eleven Circuits
have stated polygraph evidence can be admitted if stipulated to by both parties before the
test is administered. See, e.g., United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Scarborough, 43 F.3d 10211 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson 788
F.2d 517, 519 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir.
1989), aftd, 925 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1991).
See Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1267-68.
Nor can a per se polygraph prohibition be based on the concern that juries will not
be able to properly evaluate lie detector evidence. A majority of the Scheffer Court rejected
that basis for regulating that evidence. See id. Furthermore, a concern about a jury's inabil-
ity to evaluate polygraph evidence should be weighed under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
The Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 trial decisions,
like other evidence decisions, must be reviewed by an appellate court using an abuse of
discretion standard. See 2JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE, § 403.02 [2] (d] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Mathew Bender 2d ed. 1997). As
long as it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to conclude that ajury's difficulties in
evaluating lie detector evidence are not substantially outweighed by the test's probative
value, an appellate court cannot reverse that ruling.
Because Scheffer states that it is reasonable for different jurisdictions to come to dif-
ferent conclusions on the admissibility of polygraph tests, it must be reasonable for trial
courts to come to different conclusions about how Rule 403 should affect such evidence. See
Scheffer, 118 S. CL at 1266. Under these circumstances, an appellate court cannot make a
per se prohibition based on its concerns about the jury's ability to evaluate the evidence.
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pose a uniform approach. Such uniformity can only be imposed by
the rule-making authority.
The point here is not to examine how polygraph evidence
should be treated, but to examine whether the process for declar-
ing general rules about particular scientific evidence whose reli-
ability is reasonably debatable should be lodged entirely outside
the judiciary. With the power placed solely with the rule-making
authority, contrary treatment of the same or similar scientific evi-
dence with debatable reliability, be it lie detectors, the causal link
between polychlorinated byphenyls ("PCBs") and lung cancer, or
any other scientific evidence, should be common. Experience in-
dicates that the rule-making authority will seldom promulgate rules
about specific scientific evidence. We do not now have many such
dictates, and nothing indicates that the pace of such congressional
rule-making will change dramatically.
As a result, only a small subset of scientific evidence will receive
uniform treatment. Moreover, because the ultimate rule-making
authority for the federal courts is Congress, only the kind of scien-
tific evidence that garners sufficient political attention and support
will be governed by uniform rules. It is unlikely that the political
process will recognize and address all of the many forms of scien-
tific evidence that could benefit from uniform treatment. Fur-
thermore, although the legislative process will not necessarily pro-
duce poor rules, 4 such rules will be adopted without the benefit of
appellate decisions that evidence codifiers often have.3 Normally,
thorough consideration by appellate courts of the merits of an evi-
dence rule guarantees that the ramifications of a rule have been
34 See Eleanor Swift, Does It Matter Who Is in Charge of Evidence Law, 25 LOy. LA L. REV.
649, 665, 668 (1992). Swift stated:
The legislative process . . .directs considered attention to conflicts in in-
terests and values when evidence codes are enacted and changed. Propos-
als are addressed by a wide variety of participants, including both legisla-
tors and interest groups....
And while the legislature is not always thought of as a repository of
moral wisdom, its deliberative processes include inputs on moral questions
far broader than common law adjudication.
'5 Cf id. at 660 (arguing that political initiatives do not consider ramifications of pas-
sage on evidence law). Swift maintained that "[t]raditionally, adjudication and legislation
have been the legal mechanisms by which value conflicts related to the proof process in...
trials have been resolved. Evidence law, first judge-made and then codified, is the result."
Id.
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explored.36 AfterJoiner, however, appellate decisions will no longer
analyze the merits of the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Rather, appellate courts will only analyze whether the trial court
abused its discretion. Without the benefit of that appellate analy-
sis, codifiers' choices may not be well considered.
Although Congress does have the power to make rules for par-
ticular forms of scientific evidence, there is also a second option.
Not only can the rule-making authority promulgate dictates for
particular kinds of scientific evidence, it can also grant appellate
courts a similar power by changing the standard of review. Abuse
of discretion review is not written in stone. It is not even written
into the Federal Rules of Evidence. 7 It is a judicially imposed
standard, and the rule-making authority can change it. If Congress
dictates an appellate review standard for scientific evidence, the
courts must follow it.ss
Joiner itself only concluded that precedent compelled the abuse
of discretion standard for scientific evidence. Joiner did not analyze
the merits of that standard for scientific evidence. An examination
of the virtues of abuse of discretion review for scientific evidence is
needed. The starting point of this examination is an exploration
36 See id. at 665, 670. Swift noted:
[W]hen evidence law is developed through adjudication, the adversary sys-
tem usually insures that careful, considered attention is paid to important
changes in the law. Such changes are formulated by judges on the basis of
competing doctrinal solutions to problems of proof presented by adversar-
ies. The judge's decision is case-specific. The judge focuses on the likely
concrete effects of the evidence change he or she is being asked to make.
The adversaries present specific arguments about benefits and costs to the
particular parties, and they may also present generalized arguments as to
the possible broad or long-term effects on other cases to illuminate the
policy choices that are at stake....
Judge-made rules develop incrementally, on a case-by-case basis. They
are subject to critique by the parties on appeal and by parties arguing the
next case. They are subject to revision by other judges throughout the le-
gal system. One-sidedness cannot dominate this process....
Id.
sd See FED. R. EViD. 103 (stating that evidentiary ruling cannot be considered "error...
unless a substantial right of the party is affected" and which error, unless it is "plain error,"
has been properly preserved by objection or offer of proof). Other than this general state
ment, Congress has neither enacted an appellate review standard specifically for scientific
evidence nor for evidence rulings generally.
S8 Cf Michael Edmund O'Neill, Note, A Two-Pronged Standard of Appellate Review for
Pretrial Bail Determinations, 99 YALE L.J. 885, 895 (1990) (stating that most crucial factor for
determining appellate review is congressional authorization). O'Neill stated: "[Clourts are
obligated to apply review standards enacted by Congress." Id.
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of the reasons traditionally given to support abuse of discretion
review.
III. REASONS FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION REVIEW
The Supreme Court has never comprehensively articulated the
policies that support abuse of discretion review. 9 In Koon v. United
States,4' however, the Court indicated several reasons for imposing
the abuse standard. Koon held that abuse of discretion review
should be used by appellate courts in reviewing trial court depar-
tures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Court came to
this conclusion because of congressional intent,4' because of the
tradition of broad trial court discretion in sentencing,42 because
trial courts are more institutionally competent than appellate
courts to make such decisions, s and because sentencing guideline
departures often depend on unique, case-specific factors that are
little susceptible to general rules pronounced by appellate courts."
See id (noting that "[n]o single, precise rule exists to guide an appellate court in
choosing a standard with which to review lower court decisions; both precedent and legal
tradition, however, recognize several factors appellate courts should consider in determin-
ing the appropriate scope of review"); see also Michael R. Bosse, Standards of Review: The
Meaning of Words, 49 ME. L. REV. 367, 370-71 (1997) (stating that "[s]tandards of review are
widely understood to be based on whether the issue 'is' one of 'fact' or 'law.' ... The labels
'fact' and 'law' are attached to issues only after the policies underlying substantive law have
influenced the appellate court to apply one standard of review or another.").
518 U.S. 81 (1996).
41 See id. at 97-98. The Court stated:
Congress was concerned about sentencing disparities, but we are just as
convinced that Congress did not intend, by establishing limited appellate
review, to vest in appellate courts wide-ranging authority over district
court sentencing decisions. Indeed, the text of [18 U.S.C.] § 3742 mani-
fests an intent that district courts retain much of their traditional sentenc-
ing discretion....
Congress directed courts of appeals to "give due deference to the
district court's application of the guidelines to the facts." 18 U.S.C. §
3742(e) (4).
Id.
42 See id. at 98 (stating that "[a] district court's decision to depart from the Guidelines
... will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional exercise of
discretion by a sentencing court").
43 See id. (noting that "[d]istrict courts have an institutional advantage over appellate
courts in making these sorts of determinations").
44 See Cooter & Cell v. Harmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) quoted in Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996). The Cooter Court stated that the departure decision involves
"the consideration of unique factors that are 'little susceptible ... of useful generalization,'"
and as a result, de novo review is "unlikely to establish clear guidelines for lower courts." Id.
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Professor Maurice Rosenberg, in his influential article, gives
similar reasons as to why broad discretion is typically granted to
trial courts. 4s Rosenberg also adds that abuse of discretion review is
supported by the desire to economize on judicial resources, to
maintain trial court morale, and to promote finality.4
The issue of congressional intent, although relevant in Koon, is
not relevant for a determination of what review standard the rule-
making authority should set for scientific evidence. With that ex-
ception, the other rationales suggested by both Rosenberg and the
Court should be explored to determine whether the policy goals
they serve are accomplished by applying abuse of discretion review
to scientific evidence. Section A of this Part will begin by exploring
Rosenberg's trio of policies - economy, trial court morale, and
finality. Sections B through D of this Part examine the applicable
policies that support abuse of discretion review as articulated by
the Supreme Court in Koon. Finally, Section E discusses the related
question of whether the novelty of scientific evidence itself should
be considered in evaluating which standard of review is most ap-
propriate.
A. Morale Uplift, Economy, and Finality
Professor Rosenberg concludes that the grounds he summarizes
as morale uplift, economy, and finality are not substantial reasons
for deciding to grant broad appellate deference to the trial court.
These reasons say little about which trial rulings should receive
deference. 7 For example, with respect to trial court morale, Ro-
senberg stated:
A trial judge might become dispirited if he had the sense that
every rapid-fire ruling he makes at trial is to be fully reviewable by
a clutch of appellate judges who can study, reflect, hear and read
at 404-05; cf. Lee, supra note 2, at 29-30 (noting that "[t]he Koon Court relied upon three
rationales to support its holding that appellate courts should review district court departure
decisions for abuse of discretion: congressional intent, institutional competence, and the
unique nature of the departure decision").
45 See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 660-65 (noting five reasons supporting abuse of
discretion standard).
46 See id. at 660-63.
47 See id. at 662 (stating that "[t]he common vice of the first three reasons - economy,
morale uplift, and finality - is their failure to provide clear clues as to which trial court
rulings are cloaked with discretionary immunity of some strength, and which are not").
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carefully assembled arguments, consult their law clerks, debate
among themselves and, after close analysis, overturn his ruling.4"
Rosenberg, however, then adds: "That reason, worthy and compas-
sionate as it is .... falls short of telling which of the rapid-fire trial
rulings are to be immune from review and which not."49
Rosenberg similarly concludes that the desire to economize on
judicial resources does not indicate which trial court rulings should
receive abuse of discretion review. The review standard for scien-
tific evidence, however, does have a distinctive effect on judicial
economy. Deference to trial court rulings on scientific evidence, as
with other evidentiary rulings, does economize on appellate judi-
cial energies, but not as much as deference to other trial rulings.'
Judicial economy for the appellate court weighs heaviest when, if
deference were not granted to the trial court, the appellate court
would have to review an entire record to make its determination)'
4 Id. at 661.
49 Id.; see also Mengler, supra note 15, at 414 (positing that Federal Rules of Evidence are
flexible partly because "the drafters believed that evidence, arguably more than any other
field of the law, calls for trial judges to make quick decisions"); cf Kelly Kunsch, Standard of
Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATM-E U. L. REv. 11, 20 (1994) (arguing erosion of
public confidence in trial courts is better rationale to defer to decisions than judges' dislike
of reversals); Louis, supra note 7, at 1015 (stating that "[tlrial judges whose decisions are
subject to free appellate review are not known to suffer morale problems and are not re-
garded as second class citizens").
50 See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 660 (stating that "[a]ppeal courts would be swamped
to the point of capsizing if every ruling by a trial judge could be presented for appellate
review"); see also Kunsch, supra note 49, at 20 (noting "reason given [for deference to trial
courts] is a reduction of court congestion. If fewer parties appeal, there will be fewer appel-
late cases."); Louis, supra note 7, at 998 (asserting that "[c]rowded appellate dockets and the
temporal inability of appellate courts to immerse themselves in the record of every case have
necessitated deference to most trial level determinations having a substantial factual com-
ponent"); cf. Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of
Appellate Review, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 645, 651 (1988). Cooper stated:
Mere reduction in the number of appeals does not have any obvious in-
trinsic virtue. Appellate courts should be responsible for deciding cases as
well as possible, and should not narrow the standard of review simply to
avoid the responsibility of decision. Nonetheless, if we cannot or will not
increase appellate capacity to the point needed to employ the best stan-
dard of review, it may be wise to serve the interests of all litigants by adopt-
ing standards of review that help sift out all but the more extreme claims
of error.
Id.
5, See Michael A. Annis, Note, Civil Procedure: Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx Corp.: An
Analysis of Rule 11 and Its Appropriate Standard of Review, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 495 (1991). Annis
maintained that "reviewing de novo a fact-specific legal conclusion is extremely time con-
suming for appellate courts. The federal courts simply do not have the resources to spend
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As Justice Scalia stated in Pierce v. Underwood:52
[E]ven where the districtjudge's full knowledge of the factual set-
ting can be acquired by the appellate court, that acquisition will
often come at unusual expense, requiring the court to undertake
the unaccustomed task of reviewing the entire record, not just to
determine whether there existed the usual minimum support for
the merits determination made by the factfinder below, but to de-
termine whether urging of the opposite merits determination was
substantially justified.5
Independent review of scientific evidence would not place that
heavy burden on appellate judges. It would require that appellate
judges master all the materials of a Daubert hearing. Because Dau-
bert hearings often contain complex and unfamiliar information,
mastery could be time-consuming.- The appellate court, however,
need only review this fraction of an entire trial record. Thus, abuse
of discretion review of scientific evidence will not save as many ap-
pellate resources as it does for review of a fact found after trial.
Unlike other evidentiary rulings, however, abuse of discretion
review of scientific evidence determinations may significantly drain
the resources of both trial courts and litigants. Without a uniform
rule about particular kinds of scientific evidence, litigants will be
entitled to a trial-level Daubert hearing each time such evidence is
time researching facts that have previously been decided. Judicial economy remains a valid
interest of the federal court system." Id. at 510 (footnote omitted).
52 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (holding that review of trial court's determination that Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), substantially justified party's position is abuse of
discretion).
5 Id. at 560.
SeeFenner, supra note 8, at 1031. Fenner stated:
It is not just a matter of training or inclination, it is also a matter of time
and resources. . . . The time pressures on the best of our judges means
that they may not "have the time to spend at trial or beforehand to make
fully considered independent decisions on validity."
Id. (quoting CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE § 7.8, at
991 (1995)).
55 Cf Louis, supra note 7, at 1038 (referring to both procedural and evidentiary ques-
tions as "procedural"). Louis stated: "The number of pages in the record relevant to proce-
dural rulings also should ordinarily be fewer than those relevant to determinations going to
the merits. Hence, the time required for free review of procedural questions will not ordi-
narily be as great as for substantive ones." Id. at 1040.
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offered 5 For example, without a per se rule on polygraphs, each
time a party seeks to offer a lie detector test into evidence, if the
opponent objects, the trial court will have to hold a hearing. Of
course, trial courts have to make many evidentiary rulings, but
most such rulings use relatively few trial court resources.57 It gen-
erally takes little effort to determine whether evidence is hearsay or
even forbidden character evidence. Abuse of discretion review of
these rulings saves appellate resources by reducing the number
and complexity of appeals. Because such trial evidentiary determi-
nations require few resources, the overall scheme - many inex-
pensive trial rulings, but few appeals - may best promote judicial
economy.
The balance, however, is different for scientific evidence. Dau-
bert hearings can require the gathering of both experts and litera-
ture and the mastering of often difficult material.& As a result,
such hearings can be costly in time and money. Abuse of discre-
tion review, with its lack of general pronouncements about particu-
lar scientific evidence, may save some appellate resources, but at
the cost of otherwise unnecessary, costly trial court hearings. Con-
sequently, abuse of discretion review for scientific evidence may
actually increase the overall drain on judicial resources.
Scientific evidence also intersects with Rosenberg's finality con-
cern differently from other evidentiary areas. One goal of finality
is to have both the litigants and society acquiesce in the outcome of
a trial as soon as possible. As Professor Rosenberg explains, "The
more reverse-proof the trial judge's rulings, the less likely the los-
ing attorney is to test them on appeal and the sooner the first ad-
judication becomes accepted and the dispute tranquilized. " -59
This theory of finality holds true for most trial court evidentiary
See Fenner, supra note 8, at 967 (stating "[w ] here Daubert testing applies, it is manda-
tory, and the expert evidence cannot be admitted without it").
57 See id. at 968 (noting reasons why mandatory evidentiary hearings may not be bur-
densome).
See id. at 1031 (emphasizing complexity of cases involving scientific evidence).
59 Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 661. Rosenberg added,
Except where restrained by the final judgment principle, the party with
the deeper pocket might try to wear down his adversary by challenging
every uncongenial ruling, whether made in the pleading, discovery, trial or
post-trial phases of the litigation. Conferring near-finality on trial court
orders by restrictive review practices dampens the possibility of that sort of
abuse.
Id. at 661-62.
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rulings because the appellate court seldom will have information
that would help it to resolve the issue better than the trial court. If
a trial court excludes evidence as too prejudicial under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, or admits hearsay that falls within the ex-
cited utterance exception, normally new facts will not develop after
the trial that might put that ruling in a different light and
strengthen the losing litigant's belief that an injustice has been
done. Because the losing litigant is generally just hoping for an
opposite evidentiary interpretation, it is fair and sensible to en-
courage the parties to accept the first adjudication.
With scientific evidence, however, additional information is of-
ten likely to develop after the trial that may cast doubt on the ini-
tial ruling. When scientific evidence is debatable and a trial court
would not abuse its discretion by either admitting or excluding that
evidence, the science itself will often be the object of continuing
study or interpretation. While an appeal is pending, new scientific
information can develop. An appeals court, however, should not
consider this new data when reviewing a Daubert ruling because the
abuse standard limits review to the trial court record. As the Sixth
Circuit stated:
[I]f we were to look at new scientific data available to us but not
available to the district court that made the admissibility determi-
nation, we would not be confining ourselves to reviewing the dis-
trict court's admissibility ruling, but would be making a de novo
determination based on post-conviction developments or articles.
... [W]e find that the key is whether the testimony met the re-
quirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 at the time of the
district court's admissibility determination, not whether subse-
quent events provide evidence that contradicts or calls into ques-
tion the district court's view at the time of its admissibility rul-
ing.60
60 United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 1993). The trial court in Bonds
admitted DNA typing. See id. at 551. Nearly two years after the hearing on the scientific
evidence and more than a year after the convictions, but eight months before the appeal was
argued and 20 months before the appellate decision, the National Research Committee of
the National Academy of Sciences issued a report on DNA typing. See id. at 551-52. The
defendants relied heavily on that report in arguing for a reversal, but the Sixth Circuit said it
could not be considered on appeal. See id. at 552.
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On the other hand, when new information that supports the
losing litigant is available, but the appellate court must turn a blind
eye to it, both the losing party and society are likely to find the re-
sulting ruling unacceptable - it will look as ifjustice has been sac-
rificed to artificial procedure. Under these circumstances, -the
abuse standard is unlikely to tranquilize disputes and produce fi-
nality. It, instead, may only fuel mistrust of the courts.
Scientific evidence rulings also raise another concern with re-
spect to finality. Abuse of discretion review tends to end the par-
ticular litigation at the trial stage without producing precedent that
will guide other courts in future cases. Consequently, a prospective
litigant will have little way of knowing whether her debatable scien-
tific evidence will be admissible. This uncertainty will lead to more
suits than if precedent had indicated that the evidence was inad-
missible. Similarly, when a litigant brings a lawsuit that hinges
upon the admissibility of such evidence, the uncertainty surround-
ing admissibility will make it harder for the litigants to assess what
terms, if any, are appropriate for settlement. Without meaningful
precedent, there might be more litigation and more protracted
litigation in the future. As commentators have stated, "If parties
know clearly in advance what each side could prove were litigation
to become necessary, nine times out of ten there will be no need
for litigation - everyone will act according to the expected re-
sult."6' If appellate review of scientific evidence could lead to use-
ful precedents, providing future litigants some measure of predict-
ability for decisions regarding scientific evidence, this factor should
be considered in selecting a review standard. 62
B. Tradition
Koon, in granting deference to trial courts for sentencing guide-
lines departures, also relied on the fact that trial courts tradition-
ally had discretion in sentencing.63 Of course, if the rule-making
authority prescribes a standard of review for scientific evidence, it
should hardly be bound by how such evidence has been treated in
the past. In fact, however, tradition actually says little about how
now to approach scientific evidence because Daubert itself is an im-
61 PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 1 (2d ed.
1998).
62 See infra notes 130-46 and accompanying text.
63 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97-99 (1996).
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portant break from historical practice.
Before Daubert, courts employed a dual-level approach to deter-
mine the admissibility of scientific evidence. Novel scientific evi-
dence was subjected to special scrutiny,rA while other expertise was
admitted with little examination. Courts seldom analyzed whether
an expert's opinion was based on "good grounds," as Daubert re-
quires. Instead, judges generally only demanded that a proffered
expert witness have appropriate qualifications. If the witness pos-
sessed the necessary credentials to be qualified as an expert, the
testimony was allowed as long as it was relevant. In practice, be-
cause courts usually determined that experts were appropriately
qualified,6 courts undertook little screening of the proffered ex-
pertise.67
Indeed, Spring Co. v. Edgar,6' which Joiner cited for the ancient
roots of the abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings,
illustrates this traditional approach to expertise. At issue in Spring
Co. were the credentials of an expert. The Court concluded,
"Whether a witness is shown to be qualified or not as an expert is a
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993). Daubert,
however, has ended the traditional distinction between novel and non-novel science: "Al-
though the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on 'novel' scientific techniques, we do not
read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evi-
dence." Id.
See id. at 590.
See Samuel R. Gross, ExpertEvidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1158 (asserting that "if it
appears that the witness has at least the minimal qualifications for an expert in the field in
which she is offered, she will usually be permitted to [testify]"); Anthony Champagne, Dan-
iel W. Shuman, & Elizabeth Whitaker, An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in
American Courts, 31 JuRIMETRICSJ. 375, 390 (1991) (arguing "[iun jury trials, if it is a close
question whether an expert is qualified to testify, 80% of the judges were inclined to let the
jury hear the testimony"); see also Christopher P. Murphy, Experts, Lias, and Guns for Hire: A
Different Perspective on the Qualification of Technical Expert Witnesses, 69 IND. LJ. 637, 654 (1994)
(noting that "qualification of an expert is within the broad discretion of the trial judge;
appellate courts will not disturb such discretion unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous").
67 See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1999, 2010-11 (1994). Giannelli stated that "the qualification of the expert presump-
tively qualifies the technique. This formulation of the relevancy approach makes the trial
court too dependent on the testifying expert. Unfortunately, experience shows that quali-
fied witnesses do testify to questionable condusions." Id; cf. David L. Faigman, To Have and
Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY LJ. 1005,
1012 (1989) (asserting that "[tlhis practice results in the presumptive admissibility of the
testimony of any accredited expert whose testimony is otherwise relevant .... The usual
response, and in fact the law's apparent course, has been to trust certain professional fields
to decide which findings can be of assistance.").
99 U.S. 645 (1878).
69 See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997). The Joiner Court cited
Springfor the ancient roots of the abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings. See id.
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preliminary question to be determined in the first place by the
[trial] court;. .. the appellate court will not reverse in such a case,
unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous." ° The "good grounds"
for the expertise, however, were never examined.7'
Daubert, however, requires more than an examination of the cre-
dentials of the proffered scientific expert. Trial courts are now
instructed to analyze the scientific expertise itself before the evi-
dence is admissible. With this requirement, the historical ap-
proach to experts and their scientific opinions was broken.
C. Institutional Competency
While Rosenberg labeled economy and finality "not particularly
impressive or substantial" reasons for granting appellate deference
to the trial court, he thought that the remaining two rationales
made good sense for the division of judicial responsibilities. 73 In
setting review standards, a rule-making authority ought to give
great weight to whether trial courts are more competent than ap-
pellate courts to make the determination and whether the trial
court's decision depends on the kind of factors that are little sus-
ceptible to general rules pronounced by appellate courts. 74
For scientific evidence, the crucial issue of institutional compe-
tency blurs into whether appellate court review will lead to the
pronouncement of useful, general rules. 75 Trial courts can be in a
7 Spring Co., 99 U.S. at 658.
71 Indeed, by today's standards, the expert evidence in Spring Co. probably should not
have been admitted. The Spring Co. Court concluded that even if the witnesses were "not
properly to be regarded as experts, the court is of the opinion that the testimony was prop-
erly admitted as a matter of common knowledge." Id. at 658.
7 See Fenner, supra note 8, at 966-67. Fenner noted that "before Daubert, once an ex-
pert's credentials were established, courts were understandably reluctant to evaluate the
expert's testimony and left that evaluation to the jury.... After Daubert, federal trial judges
are required to make their own assessment of whether the methodology underlying an
expert's opinion is fundamentally sound." Id.; see also Stephen D. Easton, "Yer Outta Here!: A
Framework for Analyzing the Potential Exclusion of Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1998). Easton asserted that before Daubert, trial courts
seldom excluded expert testimony, but that since then "trial court judges have demonstrated
new zeal for their gatekeeping responsibility... [having] a healthy dose of skepticism that
leads to a legitimate review of the reliability of expert opinions and an increased willingness
to exclude faulty expert testimony." Id.
73 SeeRosenberg, supra note 10, at 660-61.
74 See id. at 662-63.
75 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-62 (1988) (stating that standard of review
is sometimes determined by which judicial actor is better positioned to decide issue in ques-
tion); cf Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review - Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV.
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better position to make determinations than appellate courts for a
number of reasons. First, trial courts may have an institutional ad-
vantage over appellate courts in making some decisions because
trial judges may be able to draw on experiences not available to the
higher courts. As the Koon Court stated about departures from the
sentencing guidelines:
[These] are matters determined in large part by comparison with
the facts of other Guidelines cases. District courts have an institu-
tional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of
determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines
cases than appellate courts do. In 1994, for example, 93.9% of
Guidelines cases were not appealed.76
Although similar facts for scientific evidence questions are not
available, trial courts as a whole must rule on more such matters
than appellate courts. In the criminal context, for example, the
parties will seldom appeal a trial court rejection of scientific evi-
dence proffered by the prosecutor. If the accused is acquitted,
double jeopardy will normally prevent a prosecutorial appeal of the
exclusion of evidence. If the accused is convicted, the prosecutor,
as the prevailing party, will normally not have standing to raise the
evidentiary ruling on appeal. In criminal cases, then, appeals
courts will only see scientific evidence rulings that went against a
defendant who was convicted.
While the situation may not be as stark in civil cases, appeals
courts will not see admissibility decisions that went against the
party who won at trial. In addition, appeals courts will not see a
trial court decision on admissibility if the case was settled without a
trial after the evidentiary ruling. As a result, appellate courts do
231,238 (1991). Hofer asserted that
[t]he rationale behind all appellate review may be fairly characterized in
two extremes: an appellate court will defer in large part to a trial court's
determination where the lower court is in a better position tO make that
determination than is the appellate court; conversely, little or no defer-
ence is accorded where the appellate court is as capable of determining
the question as is the trial court.
Id. (quoting State v. Pepin, 110 Wis. 2d 431, 435-36 (Ct. App. 1982)); see also O'Neill, supra
note 38, at 901 (positing that "[a]n appropriate review standard must take into account the
institutional functions of courts").
76 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81,98 (1996).
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not see all the scientific evidence rulings issued by the trial courts.
Appellate courts, however, will never see all trial court rulings of
whatever ilk. If lesser appellate exposure to a legal problem by
itself justifies deference to trial court decisions, every trial court
ruling should be reviewed deferentially. Koon, however, relied on
more than just the experience differential between trial and appel-
late courts. Rather, the Koon Court also relied on some unique
factors about Sentencing Guidelines cases. Trial courts regularly
apply the Guidelines - they do so every time they sentence a de-
fendant, and sentencing is a routine occurrence in federal court.
Most sentences fall within the Guidelines and are not appealed.
Consequently, trial courts see sixteen times the Guidelines cases
that appellate courts do,77 and appellate courts generally see only
departures from the Guidelines. As a result, only trial courts have
the necessary experience to decide if the Guidelines should con-
trol. A court can properly determine whether a departure is war-
ranted only by comparing the purported distinguishing factors
from those present in the full range of cases that fall within the
Guidelines.7 While trial courts regularly see cases falling within
the Guidelines, appellate courts do not. This experience places
trial judges in a better position to determine whether a departure
is warranted, and, therefore, deference should be granted to trial
court departure decisions.
Trial courts do not retain this comparative institutional advan-
tage, however, when they issue rulings on scientific evidence. First,
it is unlikely that trial courts make as many decisions about the
admissibility of such evidence as they do about the Guidelines.
More important, unlike departure decisions, the trial courts are
not gaining essential experience with scientific evidence that is
unavailable to appellate courts.7 The primary job of a trial court
7 See id.
78 See id. (stating that "[w]hether a given factor is present to a degree not adequately
considered by the Commission, or whether a discouraged factor nonetheless justifies depar-
ture because it is present in some unusual or exceptional way, are matters determined in
large part by comparison with the facts of other Guidelines cases").
Surely federal trial judges do not encounter challenged scientific evidence as often as
they sentence. Furthermore, because the overwhelming number of those sentencing de-
terminations are not departures from the Guidelines, few of these sentences are likely to be
appealed no matter what the standard of review.
With scientific evidence, any civil party who lost the trial court ruling and then lost
the case in the trial court, whether by trial or summary judgment, has an incentive to appeal
that trial court evidentiary ruling. Similarly, almost any defendant convicted at trial who lost
such a ruling has reason to appeal the evidentiary decision. As a result, a higher percentage
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with scientific evidence is not simply to compare it with scientific
evidence proffered in other cases. Instead, the trial court must
measure the challenged evidence against Daubert's requirements,
and appellate courts have just as much access to those require-
ments as do the trial courts. Even if trial courts are exposed to sci-
entific evidence questions more often than appellate courts, that
increased experience does not necessarily make trial courts more
competent to decide whether scientific evidence is admissible.
If trial courts are truly more competent than appellate courts in
determining admissibility, it must be for some other reason than
experience. The most common rationale for ceding the trial court
an institutional advantage is that the trial court personally wit-
nessed the hearing or trial, giving that court information that an
appellate record cannot convey.Y As Professor Rosenberg cau-
tions, however, the immediacy of a trial court's position does not
always mean that its decisions deserve deference.
That is a sound and proper reason for conferring a substantial
measure of respect to the trial judge's ruling whenever it is based
on facts or circumstances that are critical to decision and that the
record imperfectly conveys. This reason is a discriminating one,
for it helps identify the subject matter as to which an appellate
court should defer to the trial judge... .1
of scientific evidence questions are probably appealed than sentences. Moreover, because
appeals courts sit in panels, three appellate judges are exposed to the scientific evidence
question every time one is appealed. Consequently, appellate judges can have nearly as
much opportunity to see a broad range of scientific evidence questions as does an individual
trial judge.
The abuse of discretion review standard for scientific evidence will discourage ap-
peals and decrease appellate opportunities to be Familiar with scientific evidence, but using
this fact to justify abuse of discretion review is a circular argument not based on the inherent
institutional advantages trial courts have over appellate courts.
8o See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 663. Rosenberg asserted:
[Pirobably the most pointed and helpful [reason] for bestowing discretion
on the trial judge as to many matters is, paradoxically, the superiority of
his nether position. It is not that he knows more than his loftier brothers;
rather, he sees more and senses more. In the dialogue between the appel-
late judges and the trial judge, the former often seem to be saying: "You
were there. We do not think we would have done what you did, but we
were not present and we may be unaware of significant matters, for the re-
cord does not adequately convey to us all that went on at the trial. There-
fore, we defer to you."
Id. It d. at 664-65; cf David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL.
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Certainly an appellate record cannot capture all of the reasons
for a trial court's decision when the trial court has heard witnesses
and made credibility determinations about their testimony that are
crucial to the court's ruling82 Credibility assessments depend on
many things, such as demeanor, that cannot be adequately con-
veyed in a record, and therefore, our system operates under the
assumption that those who have observed the witnesses are in a
better position to assess credibility than those who only rely on the
record. When credibility is critical to a ruling and the trial court
has observed the witnesses, the trial court is institutionally more
competent to make the decision than an appellate court.83
While witnesses may testify to aid a Daubert ruling, personal
credibility is seldom at the core of a decision regarding the admis-
L. REV. 937,979 (1990).
In particular, Leonard stated that "the issue is the appellate court's ability to decide
that the trial court did indeed commit error. When the appellate court cannot make that
determination precisely because of the trial court's unique and superior position in applying
certain judgement-based evidentiary rules, then deference is proper...." Id.; see also United
States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 346-47 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens con-
cluded that deference should be granted to a trial court decision to dismiss with prejudice
because of a Speedy Trial Act violation because a trial judge
has a much better understanding, not only of what actually happened, but
also of the significance of certain events, than does a judge who must re-
construct that history from a confusing sequence of written orders and
motions. Moreover, the trial judge is privy to certain information not al-
ways reflected in the appellate record....
Id.
See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995) (outlining when Supreme Court
should defer to district court). The Supreme Court has granted deference to district court
habeas corpus determinations for
issues encompass[ing] more than "basic, primary, or historical facts,"
[when] their resolution depends heavily on the trial court's appraisal of
witness credibility and demeanor .... This Court has reasoned that a trial
court is better positioned to make decisions of this genre, and has there-
fore accorded the judgment of the jurist-observer "presumptive weight."
Id.; cf. HenryJ. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 759 (1982). Friendly
explained that "[t] he most notable exception to full appellate review is deference to the trial
court's determination of the facts. The trial court's direct contact with the witnesses places
it in a superior position to perform this task." Id., see also O'Neill, supra note 38, at 902 (ex-
plaining advantages that trial courts have over appellate courts). O'Neill stated that "[tirial
courts enjoy their greatest advantage over appellate courts in making findings of fact from
evidence presented directly at trial. This is especially significant when the factual findings
are based upon an evaluation of the credibility of witnesses as they have appeared on the
stand before a trialjudge." Id.
83 See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 664 (noting that trial judge "smells the smoke of
battle and can get a sense of the interpersonal dynamics between the lawyers and the jury").
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sibility of scientific evidence."' Daubert commands the trial court to
assess the science, and science is based not on the word of a scien-
tist," but data which is available to all.86 Methods and content, not
personal authority,87 define science.M The crucial debates for the
admissibility of scientific evidence center not on the credibility of
witnesses, but on the meaning and inferences that one can extract
from the presented data and studies or the lack of such informa-
tion." The trial court does not have a privileged position over the
appellate court in making such assessments because appellate
84 There, perhaps, could be a dispute over whether a study was peer reviewed or pub-
lished or had its results doctored. The personal credibility of witnesses would have to be
assessed. If so, the trial court would be in a better position than an appellate court to de-
termine who was telling the truth about such matters.
85 Cf MICHAELJ. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
LITIGATION 5 (1983) (asserting that "the fact-finder need never take a scientific expert wit-
ness's 'word for it'").
86 See ROBERT K MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 273-74 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). Merton stated that "[t]he substantive
findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community
.... [There is] an imperative for the communication of findings. Secrecy is the antithesis of
this norm...." Id.
87 Cf. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: How TO FOLLoW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
THROUGH SOCIETY 31 (1987) (arguing that "[sIcience is seen as the opposite of the argu-
ment from authority"); KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 46 (Torchbook
ed. 1965) (explaining that no matter how intensely felt "a subjective experience, or a feeling
of conviction, can never justify a scientific statement. .. ."); Alexander Morgan Capron,
Daubert and the Quest for Value-Free "Scienific Knowledge" in the Courtroom, 30 U. RICH. L. REV.
85, 86 (1996) (asserting that "[s]cience is oriented toward the truth but its claims are pre-
sented tentatively and are subject to refutation, with an emphasis on the quality of the data
rather than on decision produced by an hierarchical structure").
88 Cf MERTON, supra note 86, at 270 (stating that scientific claims are "subjected to
preestablished impersonal criteria; consonant with observation and with previously confirmed
knowledge. The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the lists of science is not to
depend on the personal or social attributes of their protagonists.... ."); STEVEN ROSE, THE
MAKING OF MEMORY: FROM MOLECULES TO MIND 185 (Anchor ed., Doubleday 1993) (noting
that "[t]his is what is meant by claiming that scientific knowledge is 'public' knowledge -
that is, that it is in principle testable and verifiable by anyone/everyone and not merely a
matter of private belief"); Murray Levine, Scientific Method and the Adversary ModeL Some Pre-
liminary Thoughts, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 661, 664 (Sept. 1974) (explaining scientific method
canons). Levine stated:
The canons of method require that we admit as scientific only that which
is public and communicable. By those terms we mean that the observa-
tions may be made by any qualified observer who is in a position to ob-
serve and that we can tell the new observer how to put himself in such a
position.
Id.
89 Cf Fenner, supra note 8, at 1030 (stating that "review of a dispute among experts,
often including experts whose expertise was brought to bear only after preparation for the
lawsuit had begun, [may] involve assessing the truthfulness of the witnesses").
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judges can have direct access to the scientific material."
For example, Joiner's dispute over the admissibility of scientific
evidence did not hinge on the credibility of the witnesses. Instead,
the dispute was over methods, data, and most centrally, the infer-
ences to be drawn from that data. Joiner, itself, seemed to recog-
nize this. Relying on Daubert's statement that the admissibility in-
quiry must focus on principles and methods, not on the resulting
conclusions, Joiner claimed that the trial court was merely differing
with expert conclusions. The Court responded:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from
one another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from exist-
ing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
Evidence require a district court to admit opinion evidence which
is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A
court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and opinion proffered.9'
When scientific evidence is challenged, the crucial debate will
frequently be over whether the methods producing the data were
sound or whether the analytic gap between the data and proffered
opinion was too large.92 These central issues will not be settled by
assessing the credibility of witnesses. Instead, they will be resolved
by examining the relevant scientific information - data to which
both the trial and appellate court have equal access.
Joiner again illustrates this. The Supreme Court ultimately held
that the Joiner trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding
the disputed evidence. At issue were the opinions of Joiner's ex-
perts who, relying on animal and epidemiological studies, con-
cluded that PCBs and their derivatives caused or promoted Joiner's
lung cancer. The trial court concluded that the experts' reliance
on the animal studies was not a proper basis under Daubert for the
proffered opinion "for several reasons. First, there are only two
studies. Second, the studies obviously used massive doses of PCBs.
90 The trial court has the advantage that it can ask witnesses at a hearing questions to
clarify the material, while an appellate court cannot. But the appeals court will still have
access to the information that the trial court elicited. The appeals court will just not be able
to ask clarifying questions that the trial court did not ask.
91 General Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 519 (1997).
92 See id. (stating that courts may find that "there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered").
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Finally, [the mice studies were only of a] 'preliminary nature.'" 3
The Supreme Court upheld this trial court ruling. "The [ani-
mal] studies were so dissimilar to the facts presented in this litiga-
tion that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to
have rejected the experts' reliance on them."9 Joiner, thus, de-
ferred to the trial court's determination, but the reason for the
deference was not because the trial court alone had access to cru-
cial information. Instead, the Supreme Court gave reasons why the
studies did not support the expert opinions and then concluded
that the studies were "dissimilar."95 The Court's opinion indicates
that it had the information to decide whether the data adequately
supported the proffered expert testimony.
The Supreme Court has indicated elsewhere, however, that trial
courts may still be due deference even when appellate courts have
93 Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 1994). The district
court continued that because the defendants had cast sufficient doubt on the use of the
mice studies, "the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to demonstrate by a preponderance of proof
that their experts' opinions are admissible." Id. at 1324. The court concluded that plain-
tiffs' response was to argue that animal studies can be good grounds for an opinion, but did
not address "the deficiencies that Defendants have highlighted in the experts' reliance on
the animal studies at issue here." Id The court also concluded that "Plaintiffs' argument,
being unresponsive to the issue at hand, does not persuade the court to change its finding
that Plaintiffs' experts erred in relying on the mice studies...." Id.
Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 518.
95 See id The Supreme Court stated:
The studies involved infant mice that had developed cancer after being
exposed to PCBs. The infant mice in the studies had had massive doses of
PCBs injected directly into their peritoneums or stomachs. Joiner was an
adult human being whose alleged exposure to PCBs was far less than the
exposure in the animal studies. The PCBs were injected into the mice in a
highly concentrated form. The fluid with which Joiner had come into
contact generally had a much smaller PCB concentration of between 0-500
parts per million. The cancer that these mice developed was alveologenic
adenomas; Joiner had developed small-cell carcinomas. No study demon-
strated that adult mice developed cancer after being exposed to PCBs.
One of the experts admitted that no study had demonstrated that PCBs
lead to cancer in any other species.
Id.
96 The Court also gave reasons why the epidemiological studies were not a sufficient
basis for the expert opinion. About one study, Joiner noted, "Given that [the authors] were
unwilling to say that PCB exposure had caused cancer among the workers they examined,
their study did not support the experts' conclusion that Joiner's exposure to PCBs caused
his cancer." Id. About a second study, the Court stated that "[t]he increase, however, was
not statistically significant and the authors of the study did not suggest a link between the
increase in lung cancer deaths and exposure to PCBs." Id. at 519. The Court continued,
stating that "[tihe third and fourth studies were likewise of no help[,]" and then detailed
reasons. Id.
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equal access to the necessary information. In Andersen v. City of
Bessemer City,97 the trial court had found a discriminatory intent un-
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.98 The Supreme Court
concluded that intentional discrimination is a factual finding and
that the review standard for such a finding is dictated by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which then stated: "Findings of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibil-
ity of witnesses. "99
The Court held that under Rule 52(a) deference must be
granted "even when the district court's findings do not rest on a
credibility determination, but are based instead on physical or
documentary evidence or inferences from other facts."'00 The
Court conceded that "an impressive genealogy" maintained that
when trial courts make decisions based on nontestimonial evi-
dence, review should be de novo because the appellate court has
the same access to information as the trial court. The Court re-
jected that position and continued that "it is impossible to trace the
theory's lineage back to the text of Rule 52 (a).. .
97 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1994).
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573. Since then, Rule 52(a) has been amended to include a
specific reference to documentary evidence. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
100 Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574; accord Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S.
709, 714-15 (1986).
101 Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574. The Court was referring to Judge Frank's opinion, to
which Judge Augustus Hand subscribed, in Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950).
Orris adopted "approximate gradations" of review:
Where a trial judge sits without a jury, the rule varies with the character of
the evidence: (a) If he decides a fact issue on written evidence alone, we are
as able as he to determine credibility, and so we may disregard his finding.
(b) Where the evidence is partly oral and the balance is written or deals with
undisputed facts, then we may ignore the trial judge's finding and substitute
our own, (1) if the written evidence or some undisputed fact renders the
credibility of the oral testimony extremely doubtful, or (2) if the trial judge's
finding must rest exclusively on the written evidence or the undisputed facts,
so that his evaluation of credibility has no significance. (c) But where the
evidence supporting his finding as to any fact issue is entirely oral testimony,
we may disturb that finding only in the most unusual circumstances.
Id. at 539-40 (citations omitted). The crucial factor in this scheme is "our inability to ap-
praise the cogency of demeanor evidence, lost to us because it cannot be captured in the
witness' words as recorded on paper." Id. at 538-39. The court ultimately substituted its
judgment for the trial court not because it differed on credibility assessments. Instead,
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Appellate review of the admissibility of scientific evidence is simi-
lar to reviewing a trial court finding based on documentary evi-
dence. What is crucial is not a credibility determination affected
by witnesses' demeanor, but the inferences to be drawn from mate-
rial equally accessible to both trial and appellate courts. Bessemer
City held that despite this equal access, the appellate court must
grant the trial court deference. Of course, Bessemer City was inter-
preting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a), and the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence do not contain a comparable standard of
review provision.' °2 Bessemer City, however, also provides reasons as
to why such deference should be granted when a witness's credibil-
ity is not at stake.
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not
limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make de-
terminations of credibility. The trial judge's major role is the de-
termination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role
comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the
court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to
the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of
judicial resources.°s
Even without credibility determinations, deference should be
granted to the trial courts because of their greater expertise in fact-
finding. Bessemer City 's premise is that with the trial court's
repeated role in determining facts comes a general expertise in
fact-finding. Accordingly, even if a trial court has never before
faced the question of fact it must confront in a given case, general
expertise in fact-finding provides the court with the necessary
"[w]e differ from him solely about the inference which may reasonably be drawn from the
evidence, assuming without question that the witnesses he credited spoke the truth." Id. at
541 (citations omitted).
102 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 n.3 (1996). According to the Ornelas
Court:
While the Seventh Circuit uses the term "clear error" to denote the defer-
ential standard applied when reviewing determinations of reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause, we think the preferable term is "abuse of discre-
tion. . . . "Clear error" is a term of art derived from Rule 52(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies when reviewing questions of
fact.
Id. (citation omitted).
103 Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574-75.
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experience.
It is questionable whether that logic applies to scientific evi-
dence. Does experience in determining whether a person was a
"seaman,"'- whether a person is competent to stand trial,'0 5
whether "special factors" existed in setting fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act,' ° or whether guns were drawn during an in-
terrogation' °7 give trial courts expertise in deciding whether "good
grounds" exist as defined by Daubert for proffered scientific evi-
dence?' 8s Is the determination of scientific reliability really part of
the same continuum of factual determinations or is it of a different
kind?
Certainly some judges have disclaimed special competence when
it comes to scientific evidence.' °9 While judges can generally rely
on their common sense and experience to make factual determina-
tions, Daubert demands an understanding of scientific information
104 See Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 713-14 (1986).
105 SeeMaggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983).
106 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557-59 (1988).
07 See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (abuse of discretion review for
historical facts underlying "custody" determinations).
,o8 See Kunsch, supra note 49, at 23 (asserting that "[certainly a trial judge's ruling on
the admissibility of evidence cannot be characterized as a question of fact [but rather it is]
probably best characterized as one of law").
109 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). For
example, the Ninth Circuit on remand in Daubert said that
though we are largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any
of the witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility
to determine whether those experts' proposed testimony amounts to "sci-
entific knowledge," constitutes "good science," and was "derived by the
scientific method."
Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, we take
a deep breath and proceed with this task.
Id.; see also Fenner, supra note 8, at 1031. Professor Fenner commented:
Other cases have made the same point, perhaps less sarcastically, saying
that judges should keep in mind their own limited scientific knowledge,
their lack of special competence in these areas, and that they may bring
their own biases and errors to these admissibility decisions.
Many of us went to law school to avoid science or, for that matter, any-
thing else that uses numbers other than to reference volumes and page
numbers. Many of us suffer from arithmophobia. Here we are now, in
these cases, thrown right into the middle of the thing we were trying to es-
cape.
Id. (citations omitted).
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that ordinary experience and legal training do not provide." ° In
this area where many judges doubt their proficiency, one cannot
simply assume that trial court judges are better at applying Daubert
than other judges."'
Moreover, the collegial nature of the appellate process may pro-
vide appellate courts with an institutional advantage over trial
courts. AsJudge Friendly explained:
One member of a panel may bring an entirely fresh insight not
shared by the trial court or by counsel. Assuming that all panel
members take seriously their responsibility for independent exer-
cise of judgment, the give and take of discussion may produce a
result better than any single mind could reach. Finally, collegial
review tends to eliminate or curtail decisions based on impermis-
sible factors. I am not thinking of the rare cases of venality or of
prejudice in its most pejorative sense, but rather of the subcon-
scious mind-set from which fewjudges are immune.112
Because scientific evidence decisions are different from other
kinds of adjudications, they may especially benefit from the give
and take of collegial review.
Finally, although Bessemer City stated that deference was required
for all trial court findings of fact under Rule 52(a), that Court, in
effect, endorsed a sliding scale of review depending on what sort of
information the trial court had relied upon. The Court suggested
110 SeeWilliam W. Schwarzer, Introduction to REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
1-3 (Federal Judicial Center 1994). Schwarzer stated:
No longer can judges . . . rely on their common sense and experience in
evaluating the testimony of many experts ....
[S]uch a standard demands an understanding by judges of the principles
and methods that underlie scientific studies and the reasoning on which
expert evidence is based. This is a task for which few judges are ade-
quately prepared when they arrive on the bench. Without a background
in the sciences, many judges find it difficult to master the many areas of
expert evidence without neglecting the needs of the remainder of their
caseload.
Id.
1 Cf Louis, supra note 7, at 1038, 1040 (referring to both procedural and evidentiary
questions as "procedural" and concluding that "[a]n appellate court is... likely to be more
expert and reliable in matters of procedure than is a single trial judge").
11 Friendly, supra note 82, at 757; see also Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 642 (asserting that
"since most .. . appellate courts are collegial, our fondness for appellate review may also
reflect a feeling that there is safety in numbers").
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that reversals are more appropriate when the necessary informa-
tion is equally available to a reviewing court:
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credi-
bility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to
the trial court findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of
the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily
on the listener's understanding of and belief in what is said....
Documents or objective evidence[, however,] may contradict the
witness' story; or the story itself may be so internally inconsistent
or implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder could not
credit it. Where such factors are present, the court of appeals
may well find clear error even in a finding purportedly based on a
credibility determination.
If clearly erroneous review ultimately varies depending upon the
nature of the information considered, 4 the same might be true for
abuse of discretion review of scientific evidence. Perhaps because
of the nature of the information used in making determinations
about scientific evidence, an appellate court might see that abuse
standard as a sliding one and engage in a stricter examination than
it would for other abuse of discretion issues."5
Joiner, however, does not support such a sliding scale approach.
While not specifically addressing that possibility, the Court did
1S Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (emphasis added). The
Court continued,
But when a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the tes-
timony of one or two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent
and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence,
that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear er-
ror.
ld.
I See Cooper, supra note 50, at 654:
[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that greater deference is due to
findings based on the credibility of witnesses. In addition, it has suggested
that more searching review is appropriate if there is a conflict between tes-
timonial and documentary evidence .... [T]he actual degree of scrutiny
required by the clear error standard varies according to the nature of the
evidence.
15 See Lee, supra note 2, at 37 (stating that abuse of discretion has varying levels, includ-
ing "nondeferential, moderately deferential, substantially deferential, and completely defer-
ential review").
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expressly reject the Eleventh Circuit's notion of rigorous abuse of
discretion review. The circuit court in Joiner held that evidentiary
admissibility decisions were reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but
then continued, "Because the Federal Rules of Evidence governing
expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a
particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge's
exclusion of expert testimony."  The Supreme Court, however,
rejected the notion that different review standards should apply
depending on whether the evidence was admitted or excluded."'
The Court held that abuse of discretion review applies to the
admissibility of expert testimony and concluded, "In applying an
overly 'stringent' review . . . , [the Eleventh Circuit] failed to give
the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse of
discretion review." 8 Nothing in this logic indicates that abuse of
discretion review for scientific evidence is different from abuse of
discretion review for any other evidentiary decision. Deviation
from this usual standard, if it is wise, will have to be authorized by
the rule-making authority.
D. Meaningful Precedent
The abuse of discretion review standard may also be justified
because appellate courts will be unable to generate meaningful
precedent. A major function of appellate courts is to formulate
rules of general applicability that will govern future cases."9 A goal
n1 Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (11 th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 517. TheJoiner court also stated:
We likewise reject respondent's argument that because the granting of
summary judgment in this case was "outcome determinative," it should
have been subjected to a more searching standard of review. On a motion
for summary judgment, disputed issues of fact are resolved against the
moving party .... But the question of admissibility of expert testimony is
not such an issue of fact, and is reviewable under the abuse of discretion
standard.
Id.
118 Id.
1 See Cooper, supra note 50, at 649 (noting that "the federal courts of appeals serve two
functions: the correction of error in individual cases and the development of the law in ways
that will guide future conduct and future litigation"); see also Louis, supra note 7, at 1006
(asserting that appellate courts' two principle functions are declaring law and supervising
lower court decisions); cf O'Neill, supra note 38, at 901 (arguing that appellate courts have
three essential functions). O'Neill asserted:
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of law is to treat like situations alike. °2  Deference to trial courts
can conflict with this desired consistency. 2 1 If, however, the issue is
not one that will benefit from the establishment of general rules,
deference to the trial court may be appropiate.ss As Professor
Rosenberg stated:
One of the "good" reasons for conferring discretion on the
trial judge is the sheer impracticability of formulating a rule of
decision for the matter in issue. Many questions that arise in liti-
gation are not amenable to regulation by rule because they in-
volve multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist
generalization - at least, for the time being... . When the ruling
under attack is one that does not seem to admit of control by a
rule that can be formulated or criteria that can be indicated,
prudence and necessity agree it should be left in the control of
thejudge at the trial 125
When the factors underlying the trial court's ruling are either so
variable or so specific they are unlikely to recur, the appellate court
will be unable to announce a useful rule for future application.2 4
First, appellate courts are well-suited to develop and declare legal princi-
ples that will apply beyond the case at bar and serve as precedent in future
cases. Second, they traditionally provide a "corrective function" to guar-
antee that lower courts have done justice in a particular case. Finally, ap-
pellate courts can play a supervisory role, thereby ensuring that proper
and consistent procedures have been followed throughout the circuit.
Id. (citations omitted).
120 SeeFriendly, supra note 82, at 758 (quoting, in part, Ward v.James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273,
294 (C.A.)). Friendly stated that "broad judicial review is necessary to preserve the most
basic principle ofjurisprudence that 'we must act alike in all cases of like nature.'" Id.; see
also BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 33 (1921) (stating that "it
will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the oppo-
site way between another").
121 See Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Deision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate
Courts: TheMixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 247-48 (1991) (stating that "appel-
late courts are responsible for maintaining doctrinal uniformity"). Lee noted that "trial
courts are inherently unable to maintain the necessary perspective and inter-court coordina-
tion to achieve such uniformity in their rulings." Id. at 248.
1 See Lee, supra note 2, at 34 (stating that "[die novo or nondeferential review is gener-
ally most effective when the issue being reviewed is capable of being generalized by a rule of
broad application").
1 Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 662.
124 Cf Friendly, supra note 82, at 760 (quoting, in part, United States v. McCoy, 517 F.2d
41, 44 (7th Cir. 1975)). Friendly maintained:
[A] principle supporting deference to rulings of the trial court is the absence
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In such cases, courts do not have to be concerned with treating like
cases in a dissimilar manner because it is improbable that another
truly similar case will arise. 2 5 In these circumstances, deference to
trial court decisions is appropriate because trial courts should have
the flexibility to individualize justice for each singular situation.'26
This reasoning often justifies abuse of discretion review for evi-
dence decisions. Flexible evidence rules are needed because each
trial is unique, and trial courts must be able to take such distinctive
settings into consideration in order to further the goal of finding
truth in every case. Balancing must often be done, and trial courts
can best do the weighing of numerous and subtle factors. An ap-
pellate court formulating strict evidentiary precedents will impede
fair trials. Evidence rules, therefore, ought to be guidelines for
exercising discretion rather than rigid mandates.' 27 As long as trial
courts make evidentiary rulings within those guidelines, appellate
of the benefits that ordinarily flow from appellate review in establishing rules
that will govern future cases. This is true in the frequent situations described
by Judge Stevens, as he then was, where the factors "are so numerous, variable
and subtle that the fashioning of rigid rules would be more likely to impair
[the trial judge's] ability to deal fairly with a particular problem than lead to
ajust result."
Id. (footnote omitted).
1 See Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1986). Judge Posner stated:
[Tihe main reason for appellate deference to the findings of fact made by
the trial court is not the appellate court's lack of access to the materials
for decision but that its main responsibility is to maintain the uniformity
and coherence of the law, a responsibility not engaged if the only question
is the legal significance of a particular and nonrecurring set of historical
events.
... Review is deferential precisely because it is so unlikely that there will
be two identical cases; the appellate court's responsibility for maintaining
the uniformity of legal doctrine is not triggered.
Id.
126 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98-99 (1996) (noting deference granted trial
court departures from Sentencing Guidelines because they involve unique factors for which
appellate courts cannot fashion clear guidelines); see also Lee, supra note 2, at 34. Lee stated
that sentencing guidelines "cannot capture every possible fact relevant to sentencing. De-
parture policy enables sentencing courts to deviate from the Guidelines in cases involving
circumstances not adequately reflected in the Guidelines." Id•; cf Leonard, supra note 81, at
999 (stating that "[m]ore flexible standards allow the law to be individualized").
Cf Leonard, supra note 81, at 956. Leonard stated that evidence law has moved
"away from fixed, 'per se' rules, and toward more flexible standards that are capable of
adaptation to achieve fair and just results in particular cases." Id. (footnote omitted); see also
Mengler, supra note 15, at 414 (arguing that evidence rules steer course between broad
generalities and strict particularity).
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courts should defer to their decisions.28
Saying much the same thing, because of the singular nature of
each trial and the evidentiary problems it spawns, an evidentiary
ruling will be case specific. As a result, appellate courts will not be
able to articulate clear rules of law that transcend the individual
case and define how trial courts should decide future evidence
problems.'29 Because evidence decisions depend on numerous and
subtle nonrecurring factors that are best judged by the trial court
and because appellate courts cannot fulfill their central function by
making useful evidentiary precedents, deference should be granted
to the trial courts.
Even if this reasoning supports deference to trial courts for most
evidentiary rulings,30 scientific evidence presents different consid-
erations. The same historical question only rarely recurs in sepa-
rate trials, and evidence issues concerning a specific historical
question are unlikely to repeat. In contrast, the same scientific
evidence question will often recur. '  For example, Mr. Joiner's
128 Cf Mengler, supra note 15, at 415. Professor Mengler stated: "[T]he appellate court's
primary task is solely to check the overall fairness of a trial, not to fine-tune the Federal
Rules [of Evidence], and in the process, undermine their flexibility through binding prece-
dents." Id. (footnote omitted).
12 See Cooper, supra note 50, at 662 ("Rules of law are useful means of control, but only
to the extent that they can be stated with unescapable clarity.").
ISO Cf Berger, supra note 14, at 897. Berger argued:
[S]ome of the Federal Rules, such as the great majority of the class hear-
say exceptions, still employ a per se "rules" approach; hearsay offered pur-
suant to one of these exception is admissible only if certain specified con-
ditions are satisfied. Other Federal Rules operate as "standards." They
require the court to exercise its judgment in order to determine whether
the rule will apply....
Appellate courts often speak of reviewing the trial court's discretion re-
gardless of whether they are dealing with a rule or a standard or a mixture
of the two.
Id. (footnote omitted); see a/so Leonard, supra note 14, at 1163. Leonard stated that "[tihe
rules of evidence ... contain both judgment-based standards and clearer, per se tests. Ap-
pellate courts should not treat these two kinds of provisions equally, nor should it be as-
sumed that appellate courts should review the application of all judgment-based standards
with the same degree of deference." d (footnote omitted).
13, See Samuel R. Gross, Substance and Form in Scientific Evidence: What Daubert Didn't Do, 3
SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 129, 148 (Black et al. eds., 1995) (noting that "[t]he
exact same scientific question can come up repeatedly, in dozens or thousands of cases;
similar patterns are rare for ordinary historical issues, and when they do occur (e.g., com-
mon factual issues in airline crash cases), the number of trials involved is likely to be com-
paratively small"); cf David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 555, 560 (1995). Faigman has maintained that "[t]he scientific method as-
sumes the replicability of physical phenomena. But not all facts repeat themselves. The
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personal exposure to PCBs is a unique historical question not likely
to confront the courts in other cases. On the other hand, courts
may repeatedly face the question of whether PCBs promote can-
cer,132 and other courts will likely confront the question of whether
scientific evidence about the connection between PCBs and cancer
should be admissible. For this reason, while evidentiary disputes
should ordinarily not lead to appellate precedent, scientific evi-
dence might benefit from uniform rules.
33
Just because the same or similar evidentiary disputes regarding
scientific evidence repeat, however, does not mean that appellate
precedents should necessarily be set for scientific evidence. The
nature of science often makes the promulgation of meaningful
precedent difficult for scientific evidence, even when the same is-
sues reappear. Science is both provisional and contining.'34
While scientific questions may recur, the scientific proof concern-
ing an issue may differ significantly each time that issue is litigated
as scientific information continues to accumulate and evolve.
Thus, every time a scientific issue is presented, its accompanying
evidentiary dispute may arise in a unique setting. Still, an appellate
court ruling on admissibility in these circumstances can have value.
First, the appellate ruling can help insure that like cases are
treated alike. If no new scientific information were available,
precedent would control. The same issue in the same jurisdiction
would not be treated differently, saving time and resources for
both the trial court and future litigants.
Second, even when there is new scientific evidence and, there-
fore, precedent cannot control, something akin to traditional
common law development may occur. If the appellate courts con-
tinue to articulate why a particular kind of scientific evidence is or
classic example of facts that are intensively studied but are not replicable are historical
events." Id. (footnote omitted).
132 Cf Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin
Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1, 30 (1993). Sanders examined the scientific evidence at the Ben-
dectin tials and concluded: "Even when different experts appeared, they presented basically
the same testimony." Id. In one of the Bendectin cases, the court stated that "[t]he cases
are variation on a theme, somewhat like an orchestra which travels to different music
halls, substituting musicians from time to time but playing essentially the same reper-
toire." Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1351 (6th Cir. 1992).
153 See Faigman, supra note 20, at 974 (arguing that because questions of scientific evi-
dence may transcend particular disputes, appellate courts must be afforded ability to resolve
lower inconsistent court findings as likely to recur in other jurisdictions).
1 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (stating that
"[s]cientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision").
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is not admissible, by carefully examining the differences in proof,
lower courts may be able to extract principles that will guide them
in deciding the new cases with additional scientific information.'
This, however, may be a difficult process because it would require
trial courts to be thoroughly familiar with the scientific evidence in
each case of the possibly precedential line. Thus, when each case
is unique because scientific information is rapidly developing and
when much judicial effort would be necessary to extract preceden-
tial principles that might be difficult to formulate, |3 deference to
the lower courts could be appropriate even with repeated scientific
questions.
Yet not all of the repeatable scientific evidence issues are about
scientific conclusions, where research may lead to additional, use-
ful data. Rather, many of the scientific evidence debates focus on
recurring methodological issues where meaningful precedent may
be more useful because the facts and information underlying such
issues are often stable and equally available to appellate courts. For
example, issues concerning statistical significance can arise for
many scientific studies.17  While some scientists may customarily
require a five percent significance level, is such exactitude neces-
sary for a study to be admissible? Instead, "[s]ome commentators
have suggested that the use of 'confidence intervals' provides more
meaningful information than statistical significance because a
range of possible values is presented that is consistent with the ob-
served data."| 3s Should a trial court's decision regarding the admis-
sibility of such evidence be reviewed only for an abuse of discre-
135 Cf Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 38, 70-71 (Federal Judicial Center 1994). Judicial attitudes towards scientific
validity in toxic tort cases have evolved. See id. Berger proffered two reasons for this
evolution:
1. Courts become more conversant with the parameters of scientific and
probabilistic reasoning as they are exposed to complex statistical issues
and problems of causation in cases rife with scientific uncertainty.
2. Courts become more knowledgeable about particular factual issues
through the gradual accumulation of evidence as categories of related
cases work their way through the litigation process and mature.
Id.
136 Cf id. at 70 (stating that "the scientific issues and the differing procedural postures in
which these issues arise are too complex to be amenable to resolution by precise verbal
formulas").
137 See id. at 93 (maintaining that courts must decide whether or not to use statistical
significance levels conventionally used in expert's field).
138 Id.
330 [Vol. 32:289
The Standard of Appellate Review
tion? As the debate indicates, reasonable people differ as to how
the issue should be treated. This implies that one trial court may
exclude a study because it did not reach the five percent level of
statistical significance, and the very same study accompanied by a
confidence interval may be admitted elsewhere. With abuse of dis-
cretion review, an appellate court should affirm both rulings.
This deferential approach puts a substantial burden on the trial
courts. Each time this issue is presented, a judge will have to mas-
ter the meaning of the statistical concepts and the debate that sur-
rounds them.3 9 Yet, a meaningful appellate precedent about the
proper method is possible because the facts underlying the dispute
are not case specific and are available to the appellate court as well
as the trial judge. Furthermore, precedent could be particularly
useful because it could not only define the treatment of a specific
study, but also indicate how statistical significance should be re-
garded for other studies.'O
This debate about statistical significance does not stand alone -
it is just one example of the many disputes about methodology that
recur. Methodological issues that transcend the specific case often
have to be resolved in Daubert rulings.'4  Indeed, such a
methodological dispute is at the core of Jiner. Thus, Justice
1s9 Cf John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 511 n.119 (1986) (positing that
"[a] nyone who can comprehend the Federal Tort Claims Act can learn what standard devia-
tion and statistical significance mean").
1 Cf Berger, supra note 135, at 44. Berger stated that
[there are] many concrete interrelated scientific and legal issues that
courts regularly must confront when a case revolves around scientific evi-
dence....
[1]t seems more fruitful to concentrate on specific problems that require
a considerable investment of judicial time when experts seek to testify
about scientific matters. Looking at how courts address frequently occur-
ring fact patterns may identify the kinds of questions ... that must be con-
sidered, and evidentiary and procedural solutions, compatible with Dau-
bert's objectives, that courts have used effectively.
1d.
141 See id. at 80, 90-91, 98, 101-02. (listing examples of Daubet rulings resolving issues
transcending specific cases). Professor Berger's excellent essay gives a sampling. For exam-
ple, is the testimony of a physician relying on the methodology of clinical medicine admissi-
ble to establish the cause of a disease or a birth defect? See id. at 80. What are the proper
uses of meta-analyses, which combine results from separate studies on a common scientific
issue? See id. at 90-91. "Should a court permit evidence of matching samples when no back-
ground rate is offered of the probability of a match or when there are disputes about the
appropriate background rate?" Id at 98. How or should proficiency test results be com-
bined with a probability of a match? See id at 101-02.
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Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated:
Joiner's experts used a "weight of the evidence" methodology to
assess whether Joiner's exposure to transformer fluids promoted
his lung cancer. They did not suggest that any one study
provided adequate support for their conclusions, but instead
relied on all the studies taken together (along with their
interviews ofJoiner and their review of his medical records). The
District Court, however, examined the studies one by one and
concluded that none was sufficient to show a link between PCBs
and lung cancer. . . . The focus of the opinion was on the
separate studies and the conclusions of the experts, not on the
experts' methodology....
Unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals expressly de-
cided that a "weight of the evidence" methodology was scientifi-
cally acceptable. To this extent, the Court of Appeals' opinion is
persuasive.1
The majority, however, did not resolve this methodological issue,
but held that, at least in this case, the use of either method was not
an abuse of discretion. "We.. . hold that, because it was within the
District Court's discretion to conclude that the studies upon which
the experts relied were not sufficient, whether individually or in com-
bination, to support their conclusions .... the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding their testimony."'43 Joiner,
therefore, does not give guidance to trial courts on how they
should assess the "weight of the evidence" method in the future.
As a result, trial courts examining the same scientific information
may accept or dismiss this technique and, perhaps as a result, make
contradictory, but affirmable, admissibility rulings.
Although it too was present, Joiner also did not address the issue
that is crucial for many Daubert rulings: "To what extent may a
court reject an expert's opinion on the ground that it rests on un-
founded extrapolation?"' 44 Scientific evidence is often challenged
because the scientific data does not necessarily compel a particular
conclusion, but instead an expert made a disputed inference from
1 General Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 522 (1997) (StevensJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
143 Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
144 Berger, supra note 135, at 78.
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the available information. This extrapolation problem can take
many forms, but in Joiner, as in many toxic torts cases, it centered
on the use of animal studies. If animal studies can sometimes, but
not always, support an expert opinion, what are the distinguishing
conditions for such studies? Is it proper to extrapolate from a sub-
stance's effect on animals to the substance's effect on humans?1
45
Can animal studies alone support a conclusion that a substance has
a certain effect on humans? Does the admissibility of such studies
change if there are supporting or contrary epidemiological studies?
Are studies with humans always necessary to prove causation?
While questions such as these had to be resolved in Joiner, all the
Supreme Court decided is that the trial judge did not abuse her
discretion. Trial judges will confront similar issues again, but with
abuse of discretion review in place, they will not have appellate
guidance in how to address them. Trial court judges must start
from scratch each time such an issue is presented, and abuse of
discretion review gives them the freedom to decide the same issue
differently from their colleagues no matter how often the issue has
been confronted before.1
145 Cf id. (asking whether courts can reject expert opinions because they rest on un-
founded extrapolations). As Professor Berger noted:
For the results of [animal] studies to be probative, at least two assump-
tions must be made: (1) that if a substance is toxic in these species of ani-
mals it must also be toxic in humans; and (2) that one can extrapolate
from the higher and more intense dosage level used in the study to the
lower level to which the plaintiff was actually exposed.
Id.
SCf. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 781 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that trial
court abused its discretion in excluding particular animal studies). The court distinguished
other cases that excluded similar studies
because most involved the exclusion of animal studies in the face of exten-
sive epidemiological data that failed to support causation, because none
involved studies on animals particularly similar to humans in the way they
react to the chemical in question, and because none involved studies the
federal government had relied on as a basis for concluding the chemical
was a probable health hazard.
Id. at 780. The Eleventh Circuit in Joiner cited this portion of Paoli for the proposition that
"it is improper to find research unreliable solely because it uses animal subjects." Joiner v.
General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 532 (11th Cir. 1996).
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E. Novelty
Although much of the foregoing suggests that meaningful
precedent can be established for scientific evidence, a final consid-
eration indicates caution. Courts have only recently begun to
grapple with many of the difficult issues that scientific evidence
presents. This novelty, perhaps, should make precedent rare for
scientific evidence even when precedents could be set. The Su-
preme Court considered a similar factor when it mandated defer-
ence to a trial court's determination that a litigant's position was
not "substantially justified" under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
As Justice Scalia stated for the unanimous Court in Pierce v. Under-
wood "We think that the question whether the Government's liti-
gating position has been 'substantially justified' is... such a multi-
farious and novel question, little susceptible, for the time being at
least, of useful generalization, and likely to profit from the experi-
ence that an abuse-of-discretion rule will permit to develop."1 4 7
Precedent is important, but should be set only when courts can
be confident that sound rules will result. Scientific evidence may
present that unusual area that Professor Rosenberg wrote about:
When the problem arises in a context so new and unsettled that
the rule-makers do not yet know what factors should shape the
result, the case may be a good one to leave to lower court discre-
tion. ... [This discretion] permits experience to accumulate at
the lowest court level before the appellate judges commit them-
selves to a prescribed rule. By according the trial judge discre-
tionary power, the appeal courts have a chance to bide their time
until they see more clearly what factors are important to decision
and how to take them into account.
14
Courts have not long been analyzing scientific evidence as Dau-
bert commands.'4 9 Perhaps the issues need to percolate undis-
turbed in the lower courts for awhile longer before prescribed
rules can be confidently set.'50 Such caution certainly should apply
147 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1988).
' Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 662-63.
149 Cf PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER & DAVID GRUMP, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL:
STATE AND FEDERAL RULES 9 (3d ed. 1997) (stating that "[d]espite the period of time that
the [Federal Rules of Evidence] have been in effect, they are 'new' as legal history and
developments go").
150 Cf Berger, supra note 135, at 71 (noting that "the judicial desire for efficiency must
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to scientific questions where information is rapidly evolving.
Precedent set too hastily for such issues not only may have little
meaning, it can be harmful to judicial authority. If appellate
courts were to say, for example, that based on the presented proof,
the opinion that PCBs promote cancer was not admissible under
Daubert, but science subsequently discovers additional information
that puts that ruling in doubt, another rule might have to be an-
nounced. Frequent reversals of this nature could undermine a
court's moral authority.
Even when the scientific issue is not rapidly developing, however,
the mere novelty of the question may counsel restraint. For exam-
ple, the debate over whether studies should only be admitted when
a prescribed statistical significance is met is not evolving in the
sense that new data about it is likely to be generated. Scientific
developments will not undermine a precedent on this issue. Even
so, the issue is so new to the courts that, at least for the moment, it
might be best to profit from the experience that deference to the
trial court will permit to develop.
IV. A PROPOSED COURSE OF ACrION FOR THE RULE-MAKING
AUTHORITY
The traditional reasons justifying abuse of discretion review do
not clearly indicate what standard is most appropriate for decisions
regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence. What this exami-
nation shows, however, is that many questions should be addressed
if the rule-making authority were to contemplate adopting a differ-
ent standard. How, then, should that authority proceed?
First, the rule-making authority should give serious thought to
the standard of review for scientific evidence because science is
playing an increasing role in our litigation, because the review
standard can control the outcomes of cases,' 5' and because the al-
be balanced against the need to allow scientific issues an opportunity to develop").
151 See Lee, supra note 2, at 2 (maintaining that "[t]he applicable standard of review is
extremely important because it can have just as much, if not more, influence upon the
disposition of the appeal as the merits of the case"); cf. Louis, supra note 7, at 1002. Louis
argued that
[t]he differences, if any, in the weights of evidence required by the
three standards for reversal are slight and incapable of precise articula-
tion. Consequently, an appellate court determined to reverse or set
aside a particular factual finding probably will not be deterred by the
greater deference that theoretically must be shown to particular fact
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location of discretion is a fundamental issue for a legal system. 15 2
Second, while it may initially seem wise to adopt a functional ap-
proach that allows review standards to be set on a case-by-case ba-
sis,153 such an ad hoc approach would be impractical. A general
rule is necessary.14
Third, the rule-making authority should examine alternatives to
Joiner's abuse of discretion review. For other issues, the Court has
rejected deferential review standards in order to advance uniform
outcomes and prevent unacceptably varied results. For example, in
Ornelas v. United States, s the Court held that a trial court's deter-
mination concerning reasonable suspicion to stop and probable
cause to search, mixed questions of law and fact, should be re-
viewed de novo.54 With deferential review, the Court reasoned,
trial judges might reach different results even without a significant
difference in facts. The Court stated: "Such varied results would be
inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law. This, if a mat-
finders.
Id.
152 See Leonard, supra note 14, at 1156 (stating that "[a]t its core, the debate about dis-
cretion is a debate about the nature of legal rules and standards and the degree to which
these mechanisms control the decision of cases"); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 237 (1985) (discussing law application judgments).
Monaghan stated that "[liaw application is a distinctive operation. The real issue is not
analytic, but allocative: what decisionmaker should decide the issue?" Id.153 Cf Lee, supra note 2, at 21 (stating that "[a] functional approach to abuse of discre-
tion review similar to the approach employed in mixed question cases, in which the standard
of review varies depending upon the nature of the inquiry, would provide greater guidance
to lower courts than the current amorphous standard").
154 Cf Louis, supra note 7, at 1012-13 (arguing thatjudge should not decide allocation of
decision for every mixed question). Louis stated:
Should courts . . . make an ad hoc assessment of relative competence for
every mixed question [of fact and law] going to the merits... ? Making
such an assessment accurately, openly, and candidly is never easy; making
it for every material element of every possible claim and defense on the
merits would be endless, confusing, and uncertain. A general rule pre-
sumptively favoring either the fact finders or the appellate judges, with
whatever controls and exceptions are necessary, is all that is practically
possible....
Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Control over Expert Testimony: Of Deference and Education,
87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1156, 1162 (1993) (arguing that expert qualification rules promote uni-
formity). Epstein posited: "The rules concerning the qualification of experts make sense for
the same reasons as the hearsay exclusion. Uniform judgments are preferred to ad hoc
ones. Quick and simple rules are preferred to endless disputations. And categorical rules
are thought to yield more reliable results, in any event." Id.
155 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
1 See id. at 692.
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ter-of-course, would be unacceptable." 57 Furthermore, because
these mixed questions "acquire content only through application,
[i]ndependent review is . . . necessary if appellate courts are to
maintain control of and to clarify the legal principles.... Finally,
de novo review tends to unify precedent" and will best establish
rules so the police know how to act. 15
Independent review, the Court continued, is warranted even
though "the mosaic which is analyzed ... is multi-faceted....
While one case is unlikely to lead to binding precedent for an-
other, sometimes the facts of separate cases will closely resemble
each other, "[a] nd even where one case may not squarely control
another one, the two decisions when viewed together may usefully
add to the body of law on the subject."" °
For similar reasons, Thompson v. Keohane,6' decided earlier in the
same Term as Ornelas, held that the "in custody" requirement of
the habeas corpus statute should receive independent appellate
review. While a state's determination of the "historical facts" was
entitled to deference, the "in custody" determination is a mixed
question of fact and law not entitled to deference because "the law
declaration aspect of independent review potentially may guide
police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law." 62
A similar approach could be used for scientific evidence. Its ad-
missibility is not a question of historical fact, but one of law or a
mixed question of fact and law.'63 The basic or historical facts un-
derlying the decision - whether testing was done, published, peer
reviewed, and so on - could be reviewed deferentially with the
157 Id. at 697.
158 Id.
15 Id. at 698.
160 Id.
161 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
162 Id. at 115.
163 Cf Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE LJ.
1535, 1543 (1998). Brewer stated:
Decisions about admissibility are made as a matter of law and as such are
subject to review by an appellate court (though the review of this judg-
ment is more lenient, more deferential, than is the review of other legal
judgments, such as the interpretation of statutory, regulatory, or constitu-
tional provisions or of the jurisdiction's authoritative common law doc-
trines).
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ultimate admissibility decision reviewed independently.'" Indeed,
at least some of the criticisms for independent review of scientific
evidence can be met with at least as much force as they were in
Omelas and Thompson. Thus, scientific questions can be expected
to repeat, and the facts underlying them are likely to be more simi-
lar from case to case than the multi-faceted mosaic in search and
seizure cases. Scientific evidence cases are more likely to produce
useful precedent for future litigation than the Fourth Amendment
cases.'65 And, certainly, similarly to the probable cause issues, even
if one scientific evidence case does not squarely control another,
the two decisions viewed together may usefully advance the law.
This seems especially so for scientific evidence because, as many
opinions already demonstrate, the nature of scientific evidence
often allows for the articulation of why such evidence is, or is not,
admissible.' Consequently, independent review of scientific evi-
denced could promote uniformity' 67 and guide lower courts and
& Cf Faigman, supra note 20, at 976. Faigman stated: "When the scientific evidence
transcends the particular case, the appellate court should apply a 'hard-look' or de nouo
review to the basis for the expert opinion. When the scientific evidence involves facts spe-
cific to the particular case, the appellate court should defer to the trier of fact below." Id
1 See Faigman, supra note 131, at 573-74 (arguing that "a large component of the deci-
sion surrounding scientific evidence transcends individual cases .... When the preliminary
facts are not case specific, logic demands little or no deference to the trial court's find-
ings."); see also Lee, supra note 121, at 285 (stating that "if an appellate court can create a
meaningful precedent when it reverses or otherwise sets aside a district court finding, then
the standard of review should be de novo. In all other circumstances the 'clearly erroneous'
standard should govern review."); cf. Mengler, supra note 15, at 452 (stating that "appellate
rulings on evidence should carry little or no precedential weight . . . [b]ecause [an evi-
dence ruling] is largely dependent on the peculiarities of the particular trial").
166 Cf Epstein, supra note 154, at 1161. Epstein stated:
It is often difficult for experts, outside of the legal arena, to articulate the
grounds on which their judgment rests. On biological or medical ques-
tions, for example, judgment often comes from an accretion of small bits
of information into a whole that more coherent than the sum of its parts.
Id.; see also Cooper, supra note 50, at 660 (noting that negligence is often treated as fact
partly because "trial judges often will be unable to make findings of fact sufficiently detailed
to communicate the full factual basis for the decision to the court of appeals").
167 See Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology
and Legal Process, 15 CARDOzo L. REv. 2183, 2203 (1994). According to Farrell,
[Daubert] failed to anticipate how confidence in the system will be eroded
by inconsistent future verdicts rendered in virtually identical cases on the
basis of scientific evidence found valid by some gatekeeping judges but not
others. If we believe that scientific truth approaches a comprehension of
objective facts, it makes no sense to permit juries to derive different con-
clusions about matters of fact, such as whether Bendectin can cause birth
defects, because one or the other must be objectively wrong. Yet, to pro-
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future litigants as much as independent review does in other legal
areas where it is established.
This, of course, does not mean that independent review for sci-
entific evidence should be established. Instead, what is clear is that
the ordinary rationales for abuse of discretion review do not neces-
sarily compel that standard for scientific evidence. What should
also be clear is that much needs to be learned before the review
standard for scientific evidence is set, and the rule-making author-
ity is the proper body to do the necessary study.
As this Article suggests, questions that the rule-making authority
should confront include:
(1) How often does the same scientific question repeat in dif-
ferent cases? How often does the evidence for that ques-
tion essentially repeat? In other words, how often does ba-
sically the same Daubert hearing repeat?
(2) How often do resolvable methodological issues repeat?
What are they? If they were resolved by precedent, would
more predictability and fewer or less costly Daubert hearings
result?
(3) How often during an appeal does new scientific informa-
tion appear that casts doubt on the trial court determina-
tion?
(4) Are there indications that with firmer precedents about
scientific evidence some suits would not have been filed or
some litigation settled more quickly?
(5) What are the comparative institutional exposures to scien-
tific evidence? How often do trial judges resolve such is-
sues? How often do appellate judges now resolve such is-
sues and how often would they with independent review?
(6) How often is the information for the admissibility decision
uniquely available to the trial court and how often does the
appellate court have access to the same data for a decision?
(7) Which institution, if either, inherently decides scientific
evidence questions better, a trial court or an appellate panel?
vide uniformity, the courts would have to establish a body of precedent
with regard to valid scientific methodologies in various disciplines, in ef-
fect legitimating particular scientific paradigms.
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The answers to questions like these should be sought and then it
can be determined what is the best appellate review standard for
scientific evidence.
CONCLUSION
Under Joiner, the admissibility of scientific evidence is reviewed
by appellate courts for an abuse of discretion. As a result, the same
issue can receive different treatment in different courts. This lack
of uniformity undercuts a basic goal of law and may increase the
amount and complexity of litigation.
While the Supreme Court determined that precedent required
the abuse of discretion standard, the rationales apart from prece-
dent usually given to support this deferential standard of review
often indicate that scientific evidence should receive independent
appellate review. While the rule-making authority has the power to
establish an appellate review standard for scientific evidence, the
authority should first collect information to learn whether appel-
late courts can truly create meaningful precedent for scientific evi-
dence as it appears they often could. If appellate courts can issue
useful rules, the central legal goal of uniformity supports changing
the standard of review. As a result, with scientific evidence treated
more predictably than it can with an abuse of discretion standard,
both judicial and litigant resources should be conserved and justice
better served.
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